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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how traditional
operational testing is conducted. The thesis also analyzes a
tool called Model-Test-Model that is recently being used.
Model-Test-Model provides a bridge between how testing is
currently done and how testing will be conducted in the
future. This analysis is conducted from a tester's point of
view and is targeted at program offices so that Program
Managers will be able to ensure that useful/beneficial
operational testing is conducted on their programs.
B . BACKGROUND
Every procurement (major weapon system, communication
systems, etc) has to demonstrate its benefits in terms of
performance and cost. The best way of demonstrating the value
and performance of a system is through testing. However, too
many programs initially "spin their wheels" by not being sure
how their particular system should be tested. Also, many
program offices do not understand (and don't necessarily wish
to understand) just what is involved in conducting a valid
operational test. Additionally, with OSD (Office of the
Secretary of Defense) mandating more simulation,
considerations need to be made as to what type and how much
simulation to use. Are simulations/modeling really indicative
of how a system will perform or how it might be produced?
What are its benefits?
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to provide future program
managers insight and background information on operational
testing and what the future role of operational testing will
be. It also gives insights as to what tools may be available
for the operational testing community.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
"What do program offices need to know/consider in order to
conduct operational testing of their programs?"
Subsidiary research questions are:
What is operational testing and how is it done?
Should program offices provide a representative system far
in advance of the operational test?
What is a "Countdown of Instrumentation"? Should program
offices be concerned with it?
What considerations of test equipment need to be made?
What is Model-Test-Model and is it effective? Should
program offices consider using it?
What role does simulation play in operational testing?
Should program offices be concerned with data
reduction/analysis in advance of the operational test?
• What is the future of operational testing?
E. SCOPE
This thesis will analyze the conduct of operational
testing using the Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM)
,
Fort Hunter Liggett, California as a representative of Army
test facilities. Fort Hunter Liggett (FHL) was chosen due to
their key involvement in operational testing and because of
their working relationship with the TRADOC Analysis Center
(TRAC) - Monterey. Fort Huntei Liggett was also chosen as the
model due to the researcher having intimate knowledge of its
procedures and instrumentation. The researcher spent a tour
at FHL as a Systems Engineer, Project Engineer, and as Chief
of the Experimentation Engineering Branch. In these
capacities, the researcher was required to interface with
other test agencies such as White Sands Missile Range, Nellis
Air Force Base (AFB) Test Agency, High Technology Test Bed at
Fort Lewis, Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA)
Harry Diamond Laboratories, Sandia Laboratories, Moffett Air
Field, and the Test Agency at Fort Hood. The researcher was
exposed to a variety of test facilities and FHL has comparable
test instrumentation and facilities. Therefore, the
researcher believes that FHL provides a valid representation
of how operational testing is conducted and of what testing
resources are available within the testing community.
Emphasis will be placed on providing agencies such as
program offices an introduction into the "nuts and bolts" of
how an operational test is conducted, why the tests are done
a particular way, and what early considerations should be




Research for this thesis consisted primarily of an indepth
literature review and interviews with key personnel involved
with operational testing at Fort Hunter Liggett (FHL) and with
modeling at the TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) -Monterey. The
personnel interviewed at FHL included the Director of
Operational Testing, the Chief of the Instrumentation
Division, and the contractors involved with conducting the
tests. These personnel were chosen in order to present the
researcher with views of operational testing from top
management, the people involved with putting instrumentation
packages together, and the people responsible for actually
conducting the tests. The Executive Officer at TRAC-Monterey
was interviewed because he had experience at both conducting
and managing the modeling efforts.
Government reports, instructions, directives, textbooks,
and periodicals were used for information sources. A thorough
review of operating procedures and on-site visits to Fort
Hunter Liggett and TRAC-Monterey provided valuable information
on their current testing and modeling techniques,
respectively. Additionally, the thesis researcher relied
heavily on his past operational (Fort Hunter Liggett) and
developmental (National Security Agency (NSA) ) testing
experiences.
II. OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter looks at the "nuts and bolts" of traditional
operational testing and evaluation. It provides an
introduction to the concept of Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E) . It gives the purpose of OT&E, presents the primary
participants in the process, describes several types of OT&E
and includes some guidelines for planning, execution, and
reporting of OT&E programs. It is not meant as a rehash of
previous publications that give an overall overview of how
testing is conducted. Rather this chapter focuses on why the
need for testing exists and on providing a detailed look at
the types of testing resources/instrumentation that currently
exist. This will provide program offices with invaluable
information on what type of instrumentation exists to
accurately represent and test their development system [Ref.
14]. This chapter also provides an analysis on the type of
future instrumentation that will be part of the tester's
inventory.
B. OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
1. Purpose
Operational test and evaluation is conducted for major
programs by an organization that is independent of the
developing, procuring, and using commands. It is typically
conducted in phases that are keyed to a decision review in the
acquisition process. It is performed using user crews,
operators or units in as realistic an environment as possible.
The OT&E provides the decision authority with the estimate of
[Ref. 3:p. 9-1]
:
• The military utility, operational effectiveness and
suitability of the new system.
• The system's desirability, considering systems already
available, and the operational benefits or burdens
associated with the new system.
• The need for modifications to the new system.
• The adequacy of doctrine, organizations, operating
techniques, tactics, and training for employment of the
system; the adequacy of maintenance support for the
system; and the adequacy of the system's performance in
the countermeasures environment.
2. OT&E Test Participants
In the Army, testing of major systems is accomplished
by the Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) , which
is an independent testing agency. Testing is conducted under
conditions as operationally realistic as possible. Troops
operating, maintaining, and supporting the system during
testing are trained to the same level as troops who will
actually perform these functions in the units. Program
management office personnel and test coordinating groups also
play important roles in the overall OT&E process.
3. Program Management Office
The Program Manager (PM) plays an important role in
the planning, reporting, and funding of operational testing.
He/she must coordinate program activities with the test
community. The PM also helps ensure that testing addresses
the critical issues and provides feedback from testing
activities to contractors.
At each milestone review, the PM is required to brief
the decision authority on the testing planned and completed on
the program. Therefore, it is important that the Program
Management Office (PMO) personnel have a good understanding of
the test program objectives. It is also important for them to
work with the test community to ensure that the OT&E is well
planned and adequate resources are available. The PMO
involves the test community by organizing Test Coordinating
Groups at the program initiation. It also involves the
testing community by establishing channels of communication
between the PMO and the key test organizations. The PMO staff
should keep appropriate members of the test community well
informed concerning system problems and the actions taken to
correct them.
4. Test Coordinating Groups
The Army's Test Integration Working Group (TIWG)
,
Navy's T&E Coordinating Group (T&ECG) , and Air Force's Test
Planning Working Group (TPWG) are chartered by their
respective Service to coordinate and integrate the planning
and execution of the T&E process [Ref. 3:p. 9-2]. The Army
and Air Force groups are chaired by a representative of the
PMO. The Navy's T&ECG is chaired by the development
coordinator. The members of these groups represent the user,
developmental tester, operational tester, independent
evaluator, logistics, training, and contractors. The
functions of the groups are to:
Facilitate the use of testing expertise.
Plan the use of instrumentation.
Evaluate the types of Facilities needed.
Determine which types of simulations and models to use.
Integrate test requirements.
Accelerate the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
coordination process
Resolve cost and scheduling problems
Provide a forum to ensure that test and evaluation of the
system is coordinated.
In the event of disagreement within a group, the issue is
resolved through normal command/staff channels. In all of the
Services, the groups help develop the TEMP.
5. Types of Operational Test and Evaluation
Operational Test and Evaluation can be subdivided into
two phases: 1) operational testing performed before the full-
rate production/deployment (Pre-production OT&E) decision and
2) the operational testing performed after the production
decision [Ref. 3:p. 9-3]. The Pre-production OT&E includes
Operational Assessments, Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation (IOT&E) and Follow-On Operational Test and
Evaluation (FOT&E) . The operational assessments begin early
in the program and continue until the system is certified
ready for the independent operational test and evaluation.
The IOT&E is conducted just prior to the full-scale production
deployment decision. It continues until Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) is achieved. After the full-rate
production/deployment, all subsequent operational testing is
referred to as Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation.
6. Early User Test and Evaluation (EUTE)
Early User (Operational) Test and Evaluation is
conducted primarily to forecast and evaluate the operational
effectiveness and suitability of the weapon system during
development. Operational assessments are conducted on the
developing system until the PMO certifies that the prototype
is ready for IOT&E.
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7. Operational Assessments
Operational assessments begin after program initiation
when the Operational Test Agencies (OTA) start their estimates
of operational effectiveness and suitability. The OTA uses
any testing results and data from other sources during an
evaluation. As the program matures, these operational
assessments are conducted on prototypes and preproduction
articles. The assessments continue until the system is fully
developed and certified ready for its IOT&E.
8. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E)
The IOT&E is the final dedicated phase of OT&E
preceding a full-rate production decision. The IOT&E is
conducted by an operational test and evaluation agency
independent of the contractor, PMO, or Developing Agency. DOD
Directive 5000.3 defines the test conditions under which such
testing must be conducted:
Operational testing shall be accomplished in an
environment as operationally realistic as possible,
including threat representative hostile forces. Typical
users should operate and maintain the system under
conditions simulating combat stress and peacetime
conditions.
The IOT&E must be conducted without system contractor
personnel participation as set forth in Public Law 99-661 by
Congress. The results from this test are evaluated and
presented to the decision authority prior to the decision to
enter full-rate production. This phase of OT&E addresses the
11
critical issues identified in the Decision Coordinating Paper
(DCP) and the TEMP.
9. Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation
The FOT&E is conducted after the Milestone III
decision. Typically FOT&E is conducted using production
systems. Specific objectives of FOT&E include:
• Testing of modifications that are to be incorporated into
production systems.
• The completion of any deferred or incomplete IOT&E.
• Assessment of operational availability.
• Spares support.
10. Test Planning
Test planning is probably one of the most, if not the
most, important parts of the OT&E process. Deliberate and
complete planning may not guarantee a successful test program,
but inadequate planning will result in significant test
problems, system failure, and cost overruns. Operation test
planning is performed by the Operational Test Agencies after
program initiation prior to each operational test phase.
Operational test planning is divided into three
phases: 1) Early planning, 2) advanced planning, and 3)
detailed planning. Early planning involves critical
operational issue development, determining the concept of
operation, envisioning the operational environment, and
developing mission scenarios and resource requirements.
Advanced planning entails the determination of the purpose and
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scope of testing, identification of critical issues,
development of test objectives, establishment of a test
approach and estimating test resource requirements. Detailed
planning involves the development of step-by-step procedures
to be followed as well as the coordination of resource
requirements necessary to carry out OT&E.
11. Critical Operational Issues
One of the primary purposes of OT&E is to resolve
critical operational issues about the system. The first step
in an OT&E program is to identify these critical issues.
Critical issues provide focus and direction for the
operational test. When critical issues are properly
addressed, deficiencies in the system can be uncovered and
corrected. The issues form the basis for a structured
technique of analysis by which detailed subobjectives
(Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) ) can be established. During
an operational test, each subobjective is addressed by an
actual test measurement. After these issues are identified,
the evaluation plans and test design are developed for test
execution.
12. Test Realism
Realism in an OT&E program includes all of the
characteristics that make the test simulate actual combat
conditions. There must be a concern for realism throughout
the planning and conduct of the test. The three basic areas
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of particular significance in applying realism identified by
Roger Smith in his book, "Operational Test and Evaluation: A
Systems Engineering Approach", are:
• During development of the test concept paper and design of
the overall aspects of the test program, the developers
must ensure the basic test philosophy is determined and
realism is closely woven into this design.
• During planning and design of the actual test and
development of scenarios, the planners must ensure that
realism is included into the operational and maintenance
activities.
• During the actual conduct of the tests, the field testers
must ensure that the tactical realism is maintained.
13. Test Concept
In developing a test concept, it must be determined if
OT&E will be performed in parallel with systems development,
if all testing is to be done on production equipment, if
testing will be evolutionary, and if testing will have to wait
until all system capabilities are developed. These
determinations can best be answered by considering a number of
systems aspects such as test information requirements, system
availability during test periods, and the implementation of
system capabilities. The test concept is driven by the
acquisition strategy and is used for test design and
evaluation.
14. Test Execution
Test execution is the essential bridge between test
planning and test reporting. For successful execution of the
OT&E plan, the test officer must direct and control the test
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resources and collect the data required for the evaluator to
present to the decision authority. The test officer must
prepare for testing, activate and train the test team, develop
test procedures and operating instructions, control data
management, create OT&E plan revisions, and manage each of the
test missions. His/her data management duties will include
raw data collection, creating a data status matrix, ensuring
data quality assurance, processing and reduction,
verification, filing, storage, retrieval, and analysis. Upon
conclusion of all the test trials and the data reduction and
analysis, the test results must be reported.
15. Test Reports
The OT&E test reports written for decision authorities
must be timely, factual, concise, comprehensive and accurate.
The report must present a balanced view of the weapon system's
successes and failures during testing. It must also present
the system's positive aspects and its deficiencies.
The four types of reports most frequently used in
reporting OT&E results include: 1) status, 2) interim, 3)
quick-look, and 4) final reports. The status report gives
periodic updates (e.g., monthly, quarterly) and reports recent
test findings. The interim report provides a summary of the
cumulative test results to date. The quick-look report
provides preliminary test results, is usually prepared
immediately after a test event (less than 7 days) and may be
15
used to support program decision milestones due to the need to
support a decision before the final report can be written.
The final test report presents the final test results,
conclusions, and recommendations covering the entire OT&E
program with all supporting data.
C. PURPOSE OF TESTING
The materiel acquisition process can take many years from
the time a materiel requirement is identified until the system
is fielded. Although in this process operational (user)
testing accounts for only a short time period, the results
weigh heavily on any decisions to continue development, accept
the system, or terminate the program for a system acquisition
or to change organization, doctrine, and concepts for
nonmateriel requirements [Ref. 4:p. 1-1]. Therefore, the
fundamental purpose of test and evaluation (T&E) in a defense
system's development and acquisition program is to identify
the areas of risk to be reduced or eliminated [Ref. 3:p. 1-1].
Testing is an information generation activity with the
objective of reducing the risk of doing something [Ref 6:p.
1]. In general terms, we test to generate information to
reduce the risk in applying new technology or in using old
technology in new ways. We stop testing when that risk has
reduced to a level generally acceptable to those responsible
for the application. Since the uncertainties introduced by
the new technology or its novel applications drive test and
16
evaluation, testers tend to be challenged most by the very
features and characteristics that make new systems effective,
low observables technology being perhaps the most obvious
example [Ref 6:p. 1] . The Defense Science Board recently
published lists of High Leverage Technologies, Core
Technologies, and Emerging Technologies, which, when cross-
referenced against the list of Major Long-Term Military Goals,
yields an intimidating matrix of test and evaluation
challenges.
Some areas that are currently challenging the T&E
community include the following:
Nondevelopmental Items (NDI)
.
Command and Control/Data Fusion.
Strategic and Space Defense.
Use of Computer Simulations.
Threat Identification/ Interpretat ion.
Communication with Oversight Clientele.
Software.
Mission-Level Measures of Effectiveness.
Modification/Regression Testing.









• Assessment of Real-World Data.
• Cost versus Sufficiency Testing.
In some of these areas, technical considerations are clouded
by political, social or cultural ones. Both testers and
developers have to be sensitive about how weapons technology
is viewed. If, for example, we develop directed energy
weaponry to defeat optics on the battlefield, how will the
"public" react. There would exist the potential of having
enemy combatants "blinded" by the use of this weaponry. This
would go against our cultural psyche of having "clean" battles
and the thought of us blinding soldiers on the battlefield
would elicit strong objections form several groups. The
technology to simulate directed energy weapons is complex and,
when you add all the classified security measures that would
have to be used to avert negative public opinion, you can see
how this would severely hamper the testing effort. Another
example concerns the use of lasers. I was a Project Engineer
at FHL during a particular test. We were using our normal
"eye-safe" lasers to simulate the firing of the system being
tested. Somehow rumors were being circulated in the
surrounding communities that we were using high-powered lasers
and that the animals indigenous to the area were being blinded
by the reflected laser energy. Hysteria then began to run
rampant throughout the surrounding communities that reflected
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laser energy would start blinding the people. We were ordered
to halt testing until an investigation could be conducted.
The investigation confirmed that we were not using high-
powered lasers and we were allowed to continue our testing.
However, the trials we were doing at that point were invalid
and had to be performed again. This was in addition to the
days we had already lost due to the investigation. Therefore,
the testing schedule had to be prolonged, which added
significant cost to the test and delayed the writing of the
final test report. This delay slowed down the acquisition
cycle. It also affected the morale of the user troops who
were on temporary duty (TDY) and had already spent a
considerable time away from their home and families.
It has been said that, despite its utility, "Testing is a
zero value-added activity", since no system is ever improved
by the act of testing alone [Ref . 6:p. 2] . Testing is usually
performed either to find out something (experiment/test) or to
prove something (demonstration) of either an operational or
technical nature. The ultimate goal of the testing is to
reduce the risk of an unwanted result of taking some action.
Although, ideally, testing proceeds until adequate risk
reduction has been achieved, numerous other constraints tend
to affect the type, amount, and duration of testing:
• Resource Constraints - What type of testing range do we
need and is it available? Does the technology exist to
test the system we have? Is our testing budget sufficient
to adequately test our system?
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• Schedule Constraints - Is the test range that we need
available and for how long? What season (s) of the year do
we need to test?
• Environmental and Safety Constraints - Do we need to "live
fire" test our system? Are we going to use laser
designators or laser-guided weapons?
• Pressing need to Use, Deploy, or Market - How soon does
this system need to go into production? Will this system
be used in a current regional conflict?
• Desire to exploit a Technique, Technology or Opportunity-
What are the minimum testing requirements? Do we need to
operationally test or is modeling and simulation adequate?
• Security limits on Capability Exposure - What type of
classification security requirements need to be met? Do
we have adequate security safeguards to protect the data?
How do we extensively coordinate with other agencies and
maintain security?
• Programmatic Perturbations - How many systems on the
testing master schedule will have their funding
terminated? How much and what type of testing should be
done on a system that may be terminated?.
• Political, Social, and Cultural Considerations - What type
of administration is currently in office? How is public
opinion in regards to the military environment? Are we
likely to have protesters marching outside our testing
facilities due to the testing of a certain weapon system?
In addition, what constitutes enough testing is dependent
on the stakeholder (s) . A program of any size will normally
have a diverse set of stakeholders, each with a view on the
sufficiency of testing. Based on my observations of the
testing process, I conclude that the view of each stakeholder
is as follows:
• The Developing Agency - Typically believe that they have
sufficiently tested the system and that little to no
further testing is needed.
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The Program Manager - Typically views the testing
community as an agency that is looking for faults in
his/her system.
The Contractor - Their incentive is to go into production
to generate a profit from their system. Therefore, regard
testing as a necessary evil.
The User - Typically wants the system "yesterday."
The Tester - Typically have viewed their role as the
"final exam" for the system. The system must "graduate"
from their testing to go into production. Guardians of
the public trust.
The Review and Audit Community - Was everything done
according to the book?
The Analytical Community - Typically want to make sure
they have enough data to make a correct analysis.
However, how much testing is enough?
The Taxpaying Public - The best system for the least
amount of money.
The Media - Guardians of the taxpayer. Bad news makes
good news.
Congress - Proponents for and against the system.
Proponents for the system argue for limited testing while
proponents against the system argue for extensive testing.
That each stakeholder has a right to his or her special
perspective is not disputed. However, the tester is expected
to supply special contributions, including independence and
technical expertise. In other words, the tester is expected
to maintain his/her independence while taking into account all
of the stakeholders' concerns and magically producing the test
plan that will have just the right amount of testing.
Discussions of how much testing is enough have
traditionally focused on analytical approaches to the
determination of test sample size. Statistical considerations
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are essential, but may not embody all of the real-world
factors. It is difficult to find literature identifying
programs in which the amount of testing was precisely enough.
Instances of insufficient testing are much easier to cite.
Regardless, part of the professional tester's job is to
determine how much testing is enough, assess and articulate
the adequacy of testing, and defend his vision of testing
sufficiency against those of other constituencies. This is to
be done, furthermore, under very general test and evaluation
policy guidance, directives, and regulations that are
virtually free of any type of counsel regarding how much is
enough.
D. TEST AND EVALUATION INSTRUMENTATION
This section provides basic descriptions, capabilities,
and limitations of the major systems and equipment used by the
TEXCOM Experimentation Center (TEC), formerly the Combat
Development Experimentation Command (CDEC) , at Fort Hunter
Liggett, CA. The instrumentation used by TEC provides a good
example of the resources available at major Army test
facilities. By knowing what type of instrumentation is
available and their capabilities and limitations, program
offices should be better able to work with the operational
testers in ensuring that their systems are accurately
portrayed.
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The TEC is capable of providing instrumentation for two
types of tests [Ref. ll:p 1-1]:
• One-Sided Live and Non-Live Fire Tests - Conducted to
provide a limited specific piece of data needed in a study
or computer model. There is no standard test package for
these tests and the instrumentation varies from simple to
complex systems designed specifically for a particular
test.
• Force-on-Force Real-Time Casualty Assessment Tests -
Highly realistic mock battles in which casualties are
assessed by a computer acting in the capacity of a high-
speed umpire. These tests can be conducted during the day
or night with individual weapons, combat vehicles, fixed-
wing aircraft, helicopters, crew-served weapons or
infantry indirect fire.
The instrumentation used to perform the two types of tests
at FHL includes everything from a stopwatch to a complex
computer system. This instrumentation is divided into four
general categories:
• Position Location Systems - The Range Measuring System
(RMS) acquires the ranges of soldiers, ground vehicles,
and aircraft in relation to the known interrogator
locations. The ranges are used by the computer to
determine the position of the test players as a function
of time.
• Simulated Fire System - Simulates firing at live targets
and allows real-time scoring through the use of Direct
Fire Simulators (DFS)
.
• Instrumentation Control - Consists of control equipment
that causes subsystems of the instrumentation packages to
react. The Instrumentation Computer Network (ICN) and the
Integrated Information Control Center (I 2C 2 ) serve as the
central control and data collection points for other
instrumentation systems.
• Support Instrumentation Systems - Provide general support
and utility in meeting data collection requirements.
These systems include the Range Timing System (RTS) , the
Voice Recording System (VRS), the Range Communications
system (RCS) , and the Video System.
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Figure 1 provides an overview of the TEC instrumentation.
Each of the equipments that make-up the instrumentation
categories will be discussed in further detail.
1. Position Location Systems
a. Range Measuring System
The RMS provides a position location capability
when interfaced with the Computer Data Link (CDL) with the
ICN. The RMS also provides a two-way telemetry link for data
transmission and collection to and from a field player. The
system was conceived as a means of rapidly determining the
Figure 1 RMS and ICN at TEC
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time-correlated position of soldiers, vehicles, and aircraft
relative to each other in mock battles.
(1) Capabilities
• Manual Operation - The manual Control Panel forms a
message containing the address of the unit desired and an
operational mode bit. A range limit bit is then
transmitted followed by a range pulse in range or data in
SCOM (Short Communication Messages) and EAB (Extended A-
Station to Micro-B unit)
.
• Computer Control Operation - This is identical to manual
control except that the computer forms the message. In
the event that the RF (Radio Frequency) link is broken, a
no-response signal is generated after a time delay since
the last micro-b unit responded.
• Ranging Mode - When a ranging message is sent to an A-
Station, the A-Station sends a range pulse to the B-Unit,
which waits 109 seconds and returns a range pulse to the
A-Station. The 109 seconds is the B-Unit processing and
transmission time. The A-Station compensates for the
delay and transmits a number (range in two meter
increments) to the computer via the C-Station. After the
A-Stations (minimum three and maximum eight) range on a
given B-Unit, the computer calculates the position of the
B-Unit (player)
.
• Short Communication Messages (SCOM) - This mode can be
used to communicate data to and from a B-Unit. Four data
bits are transmitted from the C-Station (master
transmitting station) to A-Station to B-Unit. The I/O
(Input/Output) device can then transmit 13 data bits
through the B-Unit to the A-Station to the C-Station to
the computer.
• Extended A- to B- Mode (EAB) - This mode allows the
computer to send a 42-bit message to the I/O device
connected to the B-Unit. The B-Unit then acknowledges
receipt of the message via the A- and C-Stations.
• Extended B- to A- Mode (EBA) - The computer can request a
message from the I/O device, and the B-Unit will respond
with a 42-bit message via the A- and C-Stations.
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(2) Limitations
• The RF frequency for all RMS transmissions is 918 MHz. At
this frequency, all communications require line-of-sight,
which is difficult in the hilly terrain at FHL. The D-
Station is used to overcome line-of-sight problems between
the C-Station and A-Stations.
• The use of a single frequency band limits the system to
only one transmission at a time, thereby limiting the
number of players that can be polled in a given period of
time. The theoretical upper limit is 1,686 messages per
second. The practical upper limit is on the order of
1,000 messages per second.
Jb. Vestpack System
The individual-carried vestpack instrumentation
system consists of an Upgraded Logic Module (ULM) , a Speech
Synthesizer/Limited Expansion Interface (SS/LEI) box, a Micro-
B, and batteries. To complete the system, body-group sensors
and a miniature speaker are attached to the vestpack, and
head-group sensors and antennas are mounted on the player's
helmet.
(1) Capabilities
The vestpack is capable of decoding both
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and TEXCOM
FHL laser codes.
(2) Limitations
The vestpack battery life with two 12-volt
nickel cadmium battery packs is 13.5 hours.
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c. Linear Triaxial Accelerometer (LTA)
The LTA is used as part of an instrumentation
system that collects attitude and motion data from rotary- and
fixed-wing aircraft. The LTA provides outputs representing
the aircraft acceleration along three orthogonal axes aligned
with the airframe.
(1) Capabilities
The LTA will measure acceleration along the
three orthogonal axes to a maximum range of +/- five gravity.
(2) Limitations
Accelerometers will measure only up to +/- five
g. This is sufficient for helicopters but would not be
sufficient range for high-performance aircraft.
2. Simulated Fire System
a. Laser Transmitters
All Direct Fire Simulator (DFS) system laser
transmitters employ Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) laser diodes as
the source of the laser beam. The GaAs lasers emit invisible,
near-infrared radiation of 904 nanometers (rim) wavelength.
All transmitters have an optical system to produce nearly
collimated laser beam output. Beam divergence angles range
from 2.4 milliradians (mrad) to 52 mrad, depending on the
laser transmitter type and application.
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(1) Capabilities
• Upgraded Transmitter Signal (UTS) Laser Transmitter - the
UTS laser transmitter can be used to simulate fire from
infantry rifles, rifle grenades, machine guns, short range
missiles, and large direct fire guns. Maximum laser-to-
sensor pairing range is approximately 3,000 meters (m)
.
• IDFSS Laser Transmitter - Can be used to simulate fire
from infantry rifles, rifle grenades, machine guns, short-
range missiles, and large direct fire guns. Maximum
laser-to-sensor pairing range is approximately 3,500 m.
• Schwartz Electro-Optical Small Gun Laser (SEO SGL)
Transmitter - Can be used to simulate fire from the same
weapon systems as the IDFSS laser transmitter. Its range
is also 3, 500 m.
• Advanced Anti-Armor Vehicle Evaluation (ARMVAL) Direct
Fire Simulator (ADFS) Laser Transmitter - Can simulate
fire from large weapons or missiles and can be vehicle-,
aircraft-, or ground-mounted. Its range is in excess of
5,000 m.
• SEO Large Gun Laser (LGL) Laser Transmitter - Can be used
to simulate fire from the same weapon systems as the ADFS
laser transmitter. Its range is also in excess of 5,000
m.
• Air Defense Weapon Fire Simulator (AWFS) Laser
Transmitter- Can simulate ground-to-air missile fire from
air defense systems. It can also be used for ground-to-
ground large weapons fire. The AWFS can simulate the
target lockon angles of missile systems by scanning
through sectors of three degrees in elevation by three
degrees in azimuth. Its range is in excess of 5,000 m and
can approach 10,000 m.
(2) Limitations
• The effective range of DFS laser beams can be impaired by
smoke or dust clouds between laser and target.
• UTS Laser Transmitter - Potentially hazardous levels of
optical radiation exist out to a range of five meters to
the unaided eye, and 35 m if magnifying optics are used.
• IDFSS Laser Transmitter - Eye safety hazards can be
encountered if personnel stare into the laser beam for
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periods of time or through stabilized binoculars at ranges
less than 10 m.
• SEO SGL Laser Transmitter - Potentially hazardous levels
of optical radiation exist out to a range of five meters
to the unaided eye, and 35 m if magnifying optics are
used.
• ADFS Laser Transmitter - Potentially hazardous levels of
optical radiation exist out to a range of 12 m to the
unaided eye, and 260 m if magnifying optics are used.
• SEO LGL Laser Transmitter - Potentially hazardous levels
of optical radiation exist out to a range of 15 m to the
unaided eye, and 100 m if magnifying optics are used.
• AWFS Laser Transmitter - Potentially hazardous levels of
optical radiation exist out to a range of 56 m to the
unaided eye, and 750 m if magnifying optics are used.
• Laser Transmitter with Microcomputer (MCU) Backpack - When
used by an infantry player, there is a limit to the time
the laser and the rest of the MCU backpack can be
continuously powered.
Jb. Laser Sensors
The laser sensor is the device that detects a hit
from a laser transmitter. It consists of a near-infrared-
sensitive photodiode and amplifiers packaged in a metal case.
In front of the photosensitive area of the photodiode is a
glass window, a mesh screen for reduction of electromagnetic
interference, and an optical bandpass filter for improved
signal-to-noise characteristics. The laser sensors can be
mounted on infantry players, ground vehicles, and aircraft.
(1) Capabilities
• IDFSS Sensors - Designed for infantry players and can be
used in some vehicle applications.
• Modified TEC Sensors - The modified sensors are used in
vehicle applications. They have dual connectors so that
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multiple sensors can be strung together on a single cable
run. They can be mounted in a small cluster high on the
vehicle, or distributed at separate locations lower on the
vehicle. Helicopters can be instrumented with a small
sensor cluster on each side.
• Simulaser SR104 Sensors - These sensors are smaller and
lighter than the previous two sensors, but still have the
same capabilities. Their small size and ease of mounting
make these sensors ideal for incorporation into
specialized detector assembling such as limited field-of-
view detectors.
(2) Limitations
• Sensor windows must be kept clean of dust or mud
accumulation.
• On vehicles, the sensors must be mounted free from field-
of-view obscuration by vehicle appendages.
c. Gun Azimuth System (GAS)
The GAS senses the angle of the M-60 tank turret
relative to the hull of the tank.
(1) Capabilities
The turret angle can be measured to an accuracy
of +/- 0.2 degrees. The angle can be transmitted to the ICN
up to four times per second.
(2) Limitations - None.
d. Boresight Devices
Boresight devices are used to boresight the Direct
Fire Simulator (DFS) laser beam to the sight of the weapon on
which the laser is mounted. When hit by a laser beam, a laser
sensor on the boresight device activates a light that signals
the hit to the weapon operator. Two types of boresight
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devices are used: the International Laser System (ILS)
boresight target and the boresight box.
(1) Capabilities
• ILS Boresight Target - The ILS boresight target is used to
align the laser on infantry rifles. Elevation and azimuth
sighting errors are shown by an array on 12 sensors and
lights on a circular target that can by up to 44 inches in
diameter. The laser can be aligned to the rifles by
adjusting the rifle sight until the laser is zeroed-in on
the target center.
• Boresight Box - The boresight box is used to align the
laser to the larger weapons. The boresight box contains
a single sensor, electronic circuitry, and a single
elevation/azimuth, adjustable automotive headlight. The
sensor is on a long cable and can be temporarily affixed
to the center of a large sighting target. The laser beam
can be centered on the sensor by a scanning procedure, and
the weapon's optical sight can then be adjusted to the
center of the sighting target.
(2) Limitations
For optimum visibility, the headlight in the
boresight box must be accurately aimed at the weapon
operator.
3. Instrumentation Control
a. Instrumentation Computer Network (ICN)
The ICN's computers provide real-time control, data
collection, and processing. In addition to controlling the
Range Measuring System (RMS), the ICN processes data in real-
time the position location (PL) of all players and assesses
the engagements of field test players of opposing forces. It
also supports the time-sharing for software development, data
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reduction, and data reduction. The ICN is composed of four
subsystems:
• The Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) 1095 (DEC-10KL)
Computer.
• The PDP-11/45 Computers or Mini-Computer Complex (MCCJ
.
• The Mobile Multi-Purpose Control Station (MMCS)
.




• ICN support for large-scale Real-Time Casualty Assessment
(RTCA) field trials includes weapon system engagement
assessment and detailed data displays that are used to
control the quality of field test data.
• ICN supports field tests involving up to 100 players (B-
Units - small transponders that give each player a unique
identity), depending on the types of players. The system
also uses 84 RMS A-Stations (antenna towers used to relay
telemetry data between the players and the computer)
.
Additionally, a polling routine selects A-Stations on the
basis of response, optimizing the use of A- to B- links.
• In special cases, Position Location (PL) data are within
one to two meters. Typical PL data are accurate within
five to 10 meters. PL accuracy depends on trade-offs
between the number of players, the types of players and
the polling rate.
• The system provides status information about each player
(e.g., switches, lights, power, laser, and continuity)
using firmware routines built into the player hardware.
This information significantly reduces the time required
to maintain and "countdown" before each trail (more will
be said on just what a countdown is and what is involved) .
• The Real Time Casualty Assessment (RTCA) subsystem
consists of the following programs: 1.) Direct Fire
Casualty Assessment (models main-gun weapons and short-
range fire-and-forget weapons) 2.) Missile Fire Casualty
Assessment (models command-guided and wire-guided
missiles) 3.) Automatic Gun Casualty Assessment (models
rapid fire weapons) 4.) Small Arms Casualty Assessment
(models small arms) 5) . Indirect Fire Casualty Assessment
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(models artillery weapons, including the Copperhead) 6)
.
ZSU Casualty Assessment (models air defense guns including
the ZSU) 7) . Hellfire Casualty Assessment (models the
Hellfire and Copperhead missiles)
(2) Limitations
• The ICN maximum player load depends on the type of
players, data to be collected, and accuracy required.
Maximum player load is also limited by the RMS's capacity
of 1,000 messages per second. A typical player load is 40
to 60 players.
• Simultaneous experiment support is limited and requires
careful coordination. The system cannot handle real-time
operations and instrumentation checkout at the same time.
The two experiments must share instrumentation checkout
time and real-time operations.
Jb. Integrated Information Control Center (I2Cf)
The I 2C 2 configuration includes a Real-Time Computer
Controller (RTCC) , threat (red) and friendly (blue) controls,
red and blue Indirect Fire Casualty Assessment System (IFCAS)
controls, and communications and test director control areas.
It also includes the VIDS theater. Although the I 2C 2 has
several functions, depending on the test being conducted, its
primary functions are to provide RTCC and to exercise control
and monitoring.
(1) Capabilities
• Monitoring of player movements.
• Display of firing engagements.
• Display of player statistics.
• Display of range information.
• Data recording.
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• Variable-speed playback for post-trial analysis.
(2) Limitations
The lack of available space in the triple-wide
trailer makes it increasingly difficult to expand the I 2C2
capabilities. There are only 12 pairs of telephone lines to
control remote radios at Sites 8A and 8X. Considerable
crosstalk on these telephone lines causes interference with
communications
.
c. Computer Data Link (CDL)
The CDL enables the Mobile Multi-Purpose Control
Station computers, located at site 8A (on tope of a hill), to
communicate with the ICN (located five kilometers away in the
base computer complex) . The CDL consists of two Collins Mar-
1108 FM (frequency modulated) microwave transmitter/receiver
systems. One system is located at each end of the link. The
basic microwave equipment operates between 7.125 Gigahertz
(GHz) and 8.5 Ghz.
(1) Capabilities
The CDL is a full-duplex system that can
transmit up to 960 channels of frequency division multiplex,
or eight digital speech interpolation signals, combined in a
12.928 megabits-per-second (mbps) data rate. An encryption
interface is available. The CDL presently transmits two-way
computer data at a clock rate of 230.4 kilobits-per-second
(kbps) through the DQ 11/Varian 620 interfaces. A clock rate
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of 1.0 mbps is achieved through the DMR 11 interfaces. A data
rate of over 200 kbps has been achieved through both
interfaces.
(2) Limitations
Line-of-sight must be maintained between the
microwave antennas. The CDL supports the MMCS A-Stations and
B-Units but they cannot be used concurrently.
4 . Support Instrumentation Systems
a. Data Reduction center (DRC)
The Data Reduction Center provides the processing
capability to extract data from VAX computers, personal
computers, and terminals to produce reports of test results.
Software packages support data base management, statistical
analysis, and spreadsheet and graphical hard copy output.
(1) Capabilities
• Build and combine data bases for each field test
conducted.
• Compute statistical analysis of data based on field test
methodology.
• Produce statistical and graphical output for field test
reports.
• Provide feedback for quality control to test data.
• Provide data fields on magnetic media for field test
proponents.
(2) Limitations
• Real-time data are transferred from the ICN manually via
removable RA60 disk packs.
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• Video data must be analyzed, and data extracted and
manually entered in the DEC VAX-8600.
• Document production is limited to line printers and X-Y
plotter capabilities.
b. Range Measuring System Input/Output Test Set
(RIOTS)
The RIOTS is an instrumentation tester designed by
TEXCOM FHL. The RIOTS is capable of performing the identical
logic functions as its RMS counterparts (Micro-B and C-
Station) without requiring an RF link.
(1) Capabilities
• Player instrumentation maintenance.
• Player instrumentation countdown.
• Player instrumentation design and test.
(2) Limitations - None identified at this time.
c. Range Timing System (RTS)
The RTS provides standard time referenced to the
Geostationary Orbiting Environmental Satellite (GOES) . GOES
transmits Universal Coordinated Time (UCT), also referenced as
Greenwich Mean Time. Components of the RTS include a
satellite receiver, a 10 watt, 143.20 megahertz (MHz)
transmitter, and FM receivers. The transmitter is FM, and the





• 125 time code receivers are available in the inventory.
Ten of these are installed in panels and 11 in sync
(synchronization) boxes. The remaining are available for
future test needs.
• The sync boxes are used to initiate time generators in
audio and video recorders. The receiver panels provide
continuous time to readout devices such as Time Code
generators (TCG) , time code readers, and time displays.
• Five portable satellite receivers are available for test
purposes or off-post requirements.
(2) Limitations
Time synchronization is presently accomplished
on the players on the ground prior to start of trial. Real-
time synchronization may be possible on some ground types and
more possible on aircraft players.
d. Range Communications System (RCS)
The FHL RCS provides communications during tests
and between tests. The RCS provides field to field, field to




• Nine RCA Series 1000 repeaters, four Motorola Micor
repeaters (Data Encryption Standard (DES) compatible)
.
• 20 Motorola MCX-100 DES transceivers and approximately 10
RCA/Tactec TAC 200 units installed in contractor vehicles.
• Two Motorola syntor at 35 W output.
• Four Regency model 250A at 25 W output.
• One Aerocom Six at 25 W output.
• One Midland 70-340A at 30 w output.
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• 128 Motorola model MX-300R 12-channel DES units.
• 15 Motorola model MX-330 2-channel units.
• 14 Motorola model MX-340 12-channel units.
• 105 RCA/Tactec TAC 100 two-channel units.
• Two RCA/Tactec TAC 100 six-channel units.
(2) Limitations
• Deadspots - FHL is situated in hilly terrain which allows
for permanent or variable dead spots in coverage for
ground-based UHF/VHF and FM communications.
• DES Coverage - Communication range is decreased by
approximately 75 percent by DES operation.
• DES Compatibility - All RCS DES equipment is per Federal
Standard 1027, as supplied by Motorola Communication. All
other encryption systems (such as VINSON) are not
compatible with the FHL RCS DES.
• DES Radio Primary Power - Loss or interruption of primary
power to mobile, base, or portable radios will cause
erasure of the DES key (code) and render the units
unusable for DES operation until the radio is reprogrammed
with a key.
e. Voice Recording System (VRS)
The VRS records voice communications from radio,
telephone, or direct input sources via magnetic tape. Time is
simultaneously recorded with voice data to provide a
chronological record of communication. The VRS consists of
two independent recording vans and external antennas for RF
reception. A data reduction subsystem is also included in VRS
for data analysis of the recorded tapes.
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(1) Capabilities
• Tactical FM voice communications in the frequency range of
30 to 75 MHz.
• Very High Frequency (VHF) AM (Amplitude Modulated) is
receiving subsystem is capable of receiving tactical
aircraft communications in the 116 to 150 MHz range.
• Ultra High Frequency (UHF) AM receiving subsystem is
capable of receiving tactical aircraft communications in
the 225 to 399 Mhz range.
• Four, seven channel reel-to-reel tape recorders that
utilize 1/2-inch-wide magnetic tape. All tape decks
provide an extra tape edge track for narration purposes.
• Six Variable Gain Voice Amplifiers (VGVA) - Maintain a
constant audio-level input to the tape recorders. They
can also be patched in to verify data being recorded.
(2) Limitations
Data reduction and analysis is impeded due to
lack of tape search and time code display capabilities.
f. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Van System
The EMI van system is used to perform EMI frequency
surveillance and direction finding. It is also used to
monitor authorized and assigned radio frequencies at FHL.
(1) Capabilities
• Surveillance frequency range of 100 Hertz (Hz) to 40 GHz.
• Automatic Direction Finder (ADF)
.
• Tactical communications in the 30 to 79.95 MHz range.
• Communications scanning in the VHF/UHF frequency bands.
(2) Limitations
• Manual direction finding.
• Maximum signal of 40 GHz may be detected and analyzed.
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• Not being a computer-controlled unit limits data storage
to hard copies.
g. Programme hie Microprocessor Units
The Programmable Logic Box (PLB) , the Serial
Programmable Logic Box (SPLB) , the Microcomputer Unit (MCU)
,
the Serial Programmable Instrumentation Pallet System (SPIPS)
and the Upgraded Logic Module (ULM) are microprocessor-based
units that give each player efficient two-way data
communication with the ICN for test data collection, player
command, and test control.
(1) Capabilities
• Remote I/O Box and Aircraft I/O Box - 13 input event lines
are available for coding in both input transition-high and
input transition-low states. These events can be a
primary weapon fired, trial started, video recorder on,
etc. The events can also control action such as turning
the laser on.
• Direct Fire Simulators (Lasers) - The PLB, SPLB, MCU, ULM,
or SPIPS controls the firing rate (100 times per second),
the on-time, and the inhibit-time of the pulse-position-
coded infrared lasers that are used as weapon simulators.
• Hit Detectors (Laser Sensors) - A hit has occurred when a
laser beam is incident on any of the laser sensors, and
the PLB, SPLB, MCU, ULM, or SPIPS determines that the
pulse-position-code is valid.
• Pulse Counting (Altimeters or Gun Azimuth System (GAS) ) -
Systems that output a frequency, such as radar altimeters,
barometric altimeters, or the GAS, use the radar altimeter
input of the PLB or SPLB.
• Player Alert - The player alert devices include a sonalert
(located in the remote I/O box and infantry back system)
and a speech synthesizer (located in the ULM Vestpack and
used with 35 remote I/O boxes to put natural-voice




• Relay Control (Recorders or Strobe Lights) - Two relay
outputs are available in the PLB, SPLB, and SPIPS for
turning on recorders and strobe lights.
• Serial Bus - The SPLB uses a serial bus for communicating
with other microprocessor-driven systems.
(2) Limitations
• The PLB, SPLB, MCU, and SPIPS are only compatible with the
Infantry Direct Fire Simulator System (IDFSS) and the
large and small gun lasers. Only the odd laser IDs can be
decoded because of the cycle time of the microprocessor.
• The resolution of the time tag is 10 milliseconds.
• There are 13 line available for the coding of events to be
transmitted.
h. Programmable Bus Monitor (PBM)
The PBM provides the capability to interface with
and monitor 1553 multiplexed (mux) bus data. It is directly
compatible with the FHL RTCA microprocessor instrumentation
components and digital video encoders for post-trial analysis.
The PBM can be programmed to select data from the mux bus
words and to provide appropriate output signals to the FHL
microprocessor elements and digital encoders.
(1) Capabilities
• MIL-STD-1553 A/B mux serial bus data.
• Input of video or audio signal.
• 64 channels for RTCA output.
• Parallel - 44-bit-wide, two channels, for video encoders.
• Serial - 8-bit, two channels, for video encoders.
• Video - three channels, buffered.




The programmer interface connector (J14) is
located on the bottom panel of the PBM. This requires that
the PBM be unbolted from its mechanically mounted fixture to
provide access to J14. Electrical connections must remain
attached to the aircraft in order to supply power to the
programmer. The PBM interface cable will provide power from
the aircraft and the capability to transfer data.
i. Video System
The video system is used for recording test data
from tactical vehicles, troops, weapons, and aircraft. The
video system is capable of recording audio, video, and digital
information. Recordings made during a test can be played back
at normal speed, slow speed, or stop motion for data analysis.
Time characters synchronized to the Range Timing System (RTS)
are superimposed on the video screen to provide a time base
for quantitative measurements. Up to four independent event
markers can also be inserted in the video. Cross Hair
reticule patterns can be superimposed on the video screen to
provide a system boresight reference from which accurate
measurements can be made directly from the video screen.
(1) Capabilities
• Video Cameras - Several different types of video cameras
are available. The video cameras can be used in daylight,
low visibility, and night time conditions.
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• Lenses - A variety of lenses are available for a given
situation.
• Video Tape Recorders (VTR) - FHL uses 3/4-inch and VHS
video cassette tapes as its standard video format. There
are two 3/4-inch formats in use. One is the U-matic
format that allows a maximum of 30 minutes recording time
at 535-line scan rates. The other 3/4-inch recording
format allows recording time of one hour at 875-line scan
rates. The VHS recording 1/2-inch format is generally
used at a two hour recording speed but it can also be
operated at a six hour recording speed with little
degradation in playback quality.
• Video Monitors - A wide assortment of video monitors are
available.
• Time Code Generator (TCG) - The Datum Model 9150 TCG
operates as a TCG using internal 1 MHz, 5 MHz, or 10 MHz
oscillator as a time base. It is synchronized to the RTS
or wherever a source of IRIG-B is available. The TCG
displays time in hours, : minutes, seconds, and tenths of
seconds. The three-digit-days display can be used to
indicate event flag status of the PLB, ULM, etc.
• Cross Hair Reticle Pattern Generator - The generator
inserts an adjustable horizontal and vertical bar into the
video scene. A box (with size, shape, and position
adjustment) is also inserted on the scene.
• Enhancer - This unit enhances the leading and trailing
edges of the contour. | This more clearly defines the
outline of the subject.
• Time Synchronizer - Used to synchronize the internal
oscillator in the VCTG/TCG to the RTS. The synchronizer,
which is a portable, battery-operated unit, is also
synchronized to the RTS. The time synchronizer is then
used to synchronize each of the TCGs.
• Video Instrumentation Mobile System (VIMS) - The VIMS is
a self-contained mobile video laboratory used primarily to
support special, one-of-a-kind tests to gather information
for use in making instrumentation support decisions. The
VIMS is configured to allow rapid response, provide
instrumentation versatility, and provide support at most
locations within FHL. The system consists of local and
remote video camera assemblies. The remote camera is
mounted on a pan and tilt mount, and an be situated up to
one mile from the control and recording center in the van.
Controls for the local and remote camera include azimuth
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and elevation pointing of the mount and control of focus
and zoom functions.
• Video Microwave System - The system consists of two
complete duplex-directional relay links or two complete
omnidirectional links. The directional relay links
operate at 21 to 24 GHz and have an effective line-of-
sight range up to five miles. System bandwidth allows
transmission of 875-line video signals with little
degradation. The omnidirectional link is designed
specifically for duplex audio and video transmission
between a helicopter and a ground station. This system
operates in the 2.3 to 2.5 GHz band and also has a
bandwidth that will permit transmission of high-resolution
(875-line) video.
(2) Limitations
• Scene Lighting - Camera and lens sensitivity require
equipment (except low-light-level cameras) to be used in
daylight.
• System Resolution - Record-to-playback resolution is
limited to less than 300 television lines. The stop-
motion playback is limited to one-half available
resolution.
• VTCG - Video input signal must adhere to Electrical
Industries Association (EIA) Standard RS-170 for 525-line
scan rate and EIA Standard RS-343A for 875-line scan rate.
• Time Accuracy is limited by drift rate of internal
oscillators.
j. Video Data Reduction/Debriefing Center (VDR/DC)
The VDR/DC provides facilities for post-mission
playback of video recordings for data extraction and crew
debriefing.
(1) Capabilities
• Playback and Monitoring Capabilities - Each VDR work
station contains equipment to allow playback and
monitoring of the various video formats.
• Audio and Video Switching Unit - Each workstation is
equipped with a switch that allows routing of video
44
signals (from a playback unit) through a digital data
reader and/or an X-Y coordinate measurements unit to any
of the three monitors.
• X-Y Coordinate Measurements - Measurements are made from
a video scene using an X-Y coordinate digitizer. This
device superimposes a set of cross hairs in the video
scene and digitizes their location. Position of a target
with reference to video camera boresight can readily be
measured with the digitizer cross hairs. Typically/ the
system can produce angular measurements to any accuracy of
0.1 mrad.
• Digital Data Extraction - Provides the capability to
capture, record, and play back digital information
superimposed on a video signal. This capability was
originally developed to capture and record information
from the MIL-STD-1553 data bus; however, with suitable
interfaces, the system can record any type of digital
information.
(2) Limitations
Search rate for the two VHS playback units is
limited to two times normal speed. It is highly desirable to
be able to search video tape at least 10 times normal speed.
Improvement programs to accomplish this have been identified.
k. Automatic Direction Finder (ADF)
The King Radio KR87 ADF is a digitally tuned,
solid-state receiver that provides bearing information in the
200 KHz frequency band. The unit's gas discharge display
always displays the active ADF frequency in the left window.
The right window displays either the standby frequency, which
can be transferred to become the active frequency, or a unique
flight timer or programmable elapsed timer.
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(1) Capabilities
• The ADF automatically measures bearing with respect to a
frequency source (Amplitude Modulation (AM) radio station
or beacon)
.
• Under ideal conditions, the ADF is accurate to three
degrees when the radio frequency strength is at least 70
microvolts per meter.
• Accuracies on land vehicles vary from +/- 10 to +/- 25
degrees, depending on the vehicle and antenna location.
(2) Limitations
• Full ADF accuracy is not achieved on some of the vehicles
because the antenna cannot always be mounted in the best
position on the vehicle.
• Tactical radio transmissions interfere with the ADF.
2. Strobe Light Assemblies
The Heathkit and Hoskins aircraft strobe light
assemblies are self-contained strobe lights mounted on ground
vehicles. The strobe lights are modified to allow remote
control from the central computer through the Programmable
Logic Box (PLB) or Serial Programmable Logic Box (SPLB)
.
(1) Capabilities
• The Heathkit strobe light assembly provides the primary
kill cue notification to the ground vehicle personnel.
The strobe light flashes continuously at approximately 60
pulses per minute when activated by the computer control
relay.
• The Hoskins strobe light assembly is used as a kill
indicator, a pairing indicator, and/or a weapons
simulator. The strobe light flashes one time for each
activation of the computer control relay.
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(2) Limitations
• The Heathkit strobe light cannot be used for pairing of
fire indicator because the electronics do not allow coding
of flash at different rates.
• The strobe lights should not be powered from nickel
cadmium RACAL/BA-4386 battery sources due to high power
drain.
in. Instrumentation Pover System (IPS)
The IPS removes the harsh, ripple, dips, and
transients from vehicle power. This allows vehicles to power
sensitive instrumentation and to charge the instrumentation
batteries. The IPS provides unregulated 24 volts, Direct
Current (VDC) , regulated 13.8 VDC, a vehicle power ON light,
and a low voltage warning light with corresponding logic
signal for Built-in-Test (BIT) /Computer-Aided-Test (CAT).
The IPS consists of six basic elements:
• Transient Suppressor - Accepts the noisy input from the
vehicle power bus and, by means of a multi-state L/C
filter, reduces the worst-case transients by 1000:1.
• Reverse Blocking and Charge Limiting - The instrumentation
batteries are protected from discharging back through the
vehicles' s circuits by a 50 A (ampere) Schottky diode.
• Low Impedance Filter - A 65, 000 microfarad capacitor on
the output flattens vehicle generator ripple and minimizes
instrumentation switching transients.
• 12.0 V Regulator - A voltage regulator provides up to 4 A
at a fixed 12.0 V as an alternate output.
• Low Voltage Warning - Uses an op-amp (operational
amplifier) with 100 millivolt (mV) hysteresis to provide
snap action and prevent chatter.
• Instrumentation Batteries (External to IPS) - The
instrumentation batteries are included because they are
the major source for instrumentation power when the
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vehicle engine is not running and the sole source for
instrumentation power when vehicle power is turned off.
(1) Capabilities
• Test data on vehicles show that IPS reduces transients
from 20 V peak-to-peak (p-p)to 0.2 V p-p at 1.5 A load
(and to 0.1 V p-p at 1.0 A load)
.
• Very little current (58 milliamperes) is drawn from the
vehicle batteries by IPS with the vehicle master switch
on.
• Six parallel connectors provide parallel outputs to handle
the multiple requirements of instrumentation.
(2) Limitations
Certain precautions for cabling and
weatherproofing the IPS as outlined in the IPS Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) manual must be observed. IPS is designed to
carry 30 A continuously and is limited by a 40 A fuse on the
input. When connected through the MX-7777 Transient
Suppressor, the 50 A circuit breaker will provide adequate
protection against high current shorts.
n. Engagement Line-Of'-Sight System (ELOSS)
The ELOSS identifies periods of time when members
of opposing forces are not directly separated by terrain,
i.e., when masked. Masking and unmasking events are
transmitted through the RMS to the MCS. The state of being
unmasked indicates that direct fire is no longer precluded by
intervening hills, trees, bushes, etc. In simulated direct
fire engagements, the time interval between exposure and
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laying fire is a performance measure of target finding,
acquisition, and recognition systems.
The ELOSS simulates visible light with invisible
and omnidirectional RF transmissions between interrogators and
transponders mounted on opposing vehicles. Both interrogators
and transponders are essentially RF beacons. Two-way
transmissions and receptions that are unattenuated by
intervening terrain are taken to indicate mutual exposure.
The absence of completed transmission and receptions by the
interrogators above threshold power level are taken to mean
that terrain is providing a mask.
(1) Capabilities
,
• Range - The range of operation between interrogators and
transponders is 500 m to 15 km.
• Playing Time Considerations - The interrogators require a
line-of-sight with the master clock for initial
synchronization, after which these units maintain
synchronization for at least two hours. Resynchronization
occurs automatically whenever the master clock pulse is
received.
• Polling Rate - The polling rate is once per 750
milliseconds (ms) with the maximum of 25 interrogators.
The polling rate is established by the number of
interrogators used and is set and controlled by the master
clock. The vehicle instrumentation checks the
interrogator output for masked/unmasked state changes
every 0.5 seconds. Individual state changes are ignored.
Two consecutive outputs of a changed state are accepted




• Numerous defilade test have shown that correct
intervisibility decisions are made at distances greater
than 0.5m, above and below grazing where the edge of the
mask is in line with the two players.
• At this point in time, ELOSS has been verified to 10 km
through the use of video and post-trial real-time data
reduction. To validate ELOSS out to the range of 15 km
will require further testing with more sophisticated video
equipment than is currently available at FHL.
• Upgrading of the ELOSS system is partially complete. The
solid-state transponders and the field test sets are part
of this upgrade. The upgrade will be complete when solid-
state interrogators are procured, tested, and operational.
o. Laser Spotting Information System (LSIS)
The LSIS was designed to record digital and video
data on the return energy of laser designators employed in
military weapon systems. The LSIS is a field deployed system
that collects digital data on the amplitude and time shift of
the return laser energy and determines the range to the
targets. The video data collected shows the exact location of
the laser spot on the target in real-time mode. The LSIS has
three main subsystems: video, radiometric, and data reduction.
Additionally, three RF systems, a microwave and two VHF, are
used in remote deployments.
(1) Capabilities
• Video - The video system provides the position of the
laser spot on the target. Two cameras, both RCA TC2001,
are mixed together to provide spot video. A 2,000
millimeter (mm) Celestron C-8 lens provides for ranges up
to four km. A third RCA camera (wide angle) with a 150 mm
lens is boresighted to the assembly to enable the tracker
to find targets in a wide field-of-view.
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• Radiometric - The standard configuration involves the use
of one LFD and one radiometer. The LFD is pointed at the
designator and picks up the lasing start pulse and an
analog pulse. The analog pulse is used to blank the
equipment to enable collection of return pulses.
• Data Reduction - The video tapes, recorded during previous
missions, are threaded onto the Logicon tape drive.
Encoded information is in EBCDIC (Extended Binary Code
Decimal Interchange Code) format, and the DEC equipment




Proper data collection from the LSIS can only
be guaranteed if the system is deployed in a rigidly
structured fashion. The system cannot support freeplay
scenarios. The location of the designator and the targets
must be known at all times, and the targets must travel
predetermined routes. Additionally, there are limitations on
the sped with which the players can travel. It is suggested
that practice runs be made prior to record trails to ensure
trackability.
E. FUTURE INSTRUMENTATION
The TEC instrumentation system has competently served the
cause of testing well over the years. Numerous important
equipment decisions have been made using the data it produces.
However, the electronics industry and the capabilities of
military systems have advanced significantly since the
instrumentation system was designed. It is increasingly
difficult to find replacement parts for its components and
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many of the weapons systems the Army is developing today
cannot be simulated by this instrumentation. These
limitations also apply to TEXCOM's other test agencies and
several development efforts are underway to correct them.
1. Mobile Army Field Instrumentation System (MAFIS)
More than eleven years ago, a need to find a method of
bringing the test to the troops was identified. This was an
attempt to alleviate the social hardships experienced by the
soldiers taking part in the tests and to reduce the costs of
the tests. The Mobile Army Field Instrumentation system was
conceived to meet this need. Unfortunately, development of
this instrumentation system has produced no usable test set to
date. TEXCOM recently organized a dedicated MAFIS development
activity and refunded the project. The project was renamed
the Mobile Automated Instrumentation Suite (MAIS) and was
turned over to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) for
development.
There is little hope of early success in producing a
working mobile instrumentation system. The Army material
command is responsible for developing multi-billion dollar
weapons systems for the Army. A test instrumentation system
is not likely to have a high priority when competing with
these major projects.
A major drawback to developing an entirely new
instrumentation system is that no vehicle exists to test
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components realistically until the entire system is built.
This situation can be compared to writing a complex computer
program without testing its subroutines. The TEC has
demonstrated the ability to integrate and test components of
a new system in its RMS. It also had extensive experience
with instrumentation development. It would seem judicious for
TEXCOM to assign TEC responsibility for MAIS development.
2. Global Positioning System (GPS)
Use of GPS is an essential element of the MAIS
concept. The TEC conducted an experiment in December 1988,
which was successful in producing accurate position location
(PL) data using commercially available GPS receivers. The PL
data was successfully integrated into the RMS.
Position location accuracy in X, Y, and Z of one meter
with GPS is possible. When combined with a Navigation
Integrated system (NIS), accuracies of .1 degree in heading
and .3 degrees in roll and pitch are also possible. This
combination also provides accurate PL as the GPS receiver
moves in and out of view of the satellites in wooded terrain.
The current POSNAV (Position Navigation) system being
developed for the M1A1 tank could provide the NIS component of
the system. The TEC is designing a new player instrumentation
subsystem, the vehicle logic module, in a way that allows
POSNAV and GPS to be integrated into it.
53
The limited ability of the RMS to move data
(approximately 20,000 bits-per-second) complicates test
planning at TEC. The GPS and other new instrumentation will
significantly increase the amount of data produced. The TEC
now transmits much of its test data in video or manual for
because the RMS cannot handle more data to speed up the
process. An improved data transmission system to move the
information generated by this system must be developed.
Efforts are currently underway at TEC to develop improved
transmissions of data.
3. K-Band TRADOC Obscuration Pairing System (K-TOPS)
The K-TOPS is being developed to simulate the ability
of weapons to sight and fire through obscuration. This system
is based on police-type radar technology. It is used to allow
weapons pairing through levels of smoke and fog that defeat
current laser-based systems.
4. Non-Line-of-Sight Testing
Realistic simulation of non-line-of-sight weapons is
one of the biggest challenges facing operational testers. In
1987, TEC organized a special projects office to develop tools
needed to meet this challenge. The TEC approach envisions
establishing a one meter accuracy database of the terrain in
its primary test laboratory at FHL. This involves assembling
the hardware and writing the software to digitize this terrain
from aerial photographs. This database will then be used to
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project aspect views of the terrain over which the missile is
notionally flying on to the gunner's console screen. The
system will be linked into the RMS, which will insert
realistic icons representing other players on the terrain in
what would be their actual position if the missile were
flying.
While the simulator will allow TEC to test the effect
of non-line-of-sight weapons in battle, it will not elicit
realistic reactions from the target crews. This necessitates
the need for a surrogate missile. In partnership with the
Navy at its China Lake testing area, the same special project
group is modifying a small drone aircraft to fill this role.
The drone is launched and , held in a loiter area by its
operator until the non-line-of-sight gunner fires a missile.
At that time, the drone aircraft flies toward the target,
controlled by commands from 'the gunner's console. When the
gunner starts the missile on its final attack, the drone
breaks off its flight and returns to the control of its
operator for recovery. A tape of target impact is projected
on the gunner's screen.
F. Summary <
The most important aspect of OT&E is that it provides an
independent evaluation of the utility of a system. Equally
important, it also provides an evaluation of the feasibility
of employing a system. It is crucial that the testing
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community provide this system evaluation in an efficient and
competent manner.
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III. PROBLEMS/CRITICAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY PROGRAM MANAGERS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on providing answers to the most
frequent/critical questions asked by program offices
concerning current operational testing [Ref 9] . These
questions include: "What type of instrumentation exists to
accurately represent and test my system? (answered in Chapter
II) , "Why do testers need access to the development system so
far in advance of the test?", "Why is there so much
preparation prior to conducting a trial and why can't it be
done faster?", and "When will the test report be finished?"
These questions will be answered in this chapter using the SGT
York (DIVAD (Division Air Defense) ) test, conducted at FHL, as
an example. However, one tool, Model-Test-Model, that has
been developed with the goal of optimizing testing and is part
of the answers to the above questions will be covered in
detail in Chapter IV.
B. WHY TESTERS NEED ACCESS TO DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS EARLY IN
THE ACQUISITION CYCLE
"First article" systems refers to a representative system
that will be instrumented during a field test. This term not
only refers to the system being evaluated but also to any
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system that will partake in the field test. The SGT York test
is a good example of this situation. The SGT York (DIVAD)
antiaircraft system was the primary system being evaluated.
However, there were other systems such as the M1A1 Main Battle
Tank, the Bradley Infantry Vehicle, M113 Armored Personnel
Carriers (APC) , M60 Tanks, the Stinger air defense system, the
Chaparral air defense system, an Air Force F-lll aircraft and
A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft, a Navy A-4 aircraft, and AH-1S
Cobra helicopters. Every one of these systems had to be
instrumented to enable the SGT York to be evaluated. This was
a daunting challenge for the testers at FHL since some of
these systems had not been instrumented before by FHL.
I was a Project Engineer assigned to FHL during this test
and was one of the primary people responsible for the
instrumentation packages. Since we were to instrument some
systems we hadn't instrumented before, we needed them as far
in advance of the scheduled date of the test as possible.
Even with the systems we had previously instrumented (such as
the Chaparral and AH-1S Cobra, M60 Tank, and M113 APC), we
still needed to check them to ensure that modifications had
not been made to the systems. To appreciate why we as testers
fight so hard to obtain first article systems, some systems
and the problems we encountered will be detailed.
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1. SGT York
The SGT York provided us with some unique challenges.
The SGT York was equipped with an acquisition and tracking
radar and twin 40-mm guns. Once the acquisition radar
acquired a target, it would hand off its information
(velocity, range, etc) to the tracking radar and then the lead
and elevation angles for the guns to fire would be computed.
This would allow the SGT York to shoot a volley of shells into
the path of the aircraft and the aircraft would fly into them
and be destroyed. This presented us a problem because we use
lasers to simulate the firing of a weapon. Unfortunately, the
lasers need to be pointed in the direction of the target in
order to register a kill (the lasers simulate a direct fire
weapon) . This was not possible with the SGT York since its
twin 40 mm guns never point directly at the target. A
solution involved using a unique device to monitor the 1553
data bus and extracting the necessary bits of information to
relay them to the FHL computer complex. The computer would
then determine if any aircraft were in the vicinity of the
firing SGT York and determine the probability of kill. As
luck would have it, the device we needed was not on the market
and had to be designed, built and tested. Not only did this
require outside contractors, but also FHL software designers
had to work many manhours of overtime to develop an algorithm
for this computation.
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2. F-lll, A-10, and A-4 Aircraft
These aircraft presented not only instrumentation
challenges but coordination problems as well between FHL, and
the participating Air Force and Navy units. The aircraft
presented two problems: 1) An instrumentation pod had to be
designed and built and 2) the instrumentation power provided
by the aircraft had to be heavily filtered so that the
instrumentation would not be ruined. Once the pods were
designed and built, the FAA (Federal Aviation Agency) had to
certify the airworthiness of the pods. Anyone familiar with
bureaucracies can appreciate how long this certification took.
The FAA took approximately 3 months to officially certify the
pods and this required them to do some exceptions to policy to
get it done that "fast".
3. Chaparral
The Chaparral presented a problem that involved
connectors. Although FHL had previously instrumented the
Chaparral in years past, we still had to build some interface
cables. We did not have any of the mating connectors for the
interface cables in stock. When we tried to procure the
particular connector we needed for the cables, we found that
no manufacturer currently built it. Therefore, we had to pay
substantial retooling and production costs for a limited run.
This process took approximately 4 months from processing of
the purchase order to receipt of the connectors.
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These sample problems that occurred during the SGT
York test all required weeks and months to resolve.
Confounding the problem is trying to use the Army/DOD
procurement system which is not "user friendly". The
procurement system is not set up to procure items that are
needed expeditiously. Obtaining the needed item can take
anywhere from a month to a year.
The SGT York test was used as an example to answer the
question of "Why do the operational testers need the
development systems so far in advance of the test?" Program
offices need to understand that they cannot bring their
systems to the testing facility a few days before the test
date and expect the test to go as planned. Having testers
involved at the beginning of a program and allowing them early




C. WHY TEST TRIALS TAKE AS LONG AS THEY DO
Test trials commence once the instrumentation packages for
each system have been designed, built and tested. On the day
of the scheduled tests, the systems are moved to the staging
area. The staging area i's where all the systems (players)
have each piece of equipment in their instrumentation packages
checked prior to a test trial. This pre-trial equipment check
is crucial to ensuring that a valid (nonbiased) trial is
conducted. This equipment checkout is also commonly known as
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an instrumentation "countdown". The time to complete this
procedure depends on the number of players and on the
complexity of the instrumentation packages. For the SGT York
and AHIP (Army Helicopter Improvement Program) tests, the
countdown would start at two a.m. for a trial beginning at
eight a.m. (FHL is continually trying to improve its testing
and have been able to speed up this process [Ref. 10]).
Players will be not be allowed to leave the staging area
unless their equipment is operating properly.
Why is the countdown so crucial to a trial? Testers are
responsible for ensuring that if a system is shown to have
deficiencies it is not due to the test equipment. The purpose
of testing agencies is not to make judgements on the system
but to provide information about it. Therefore, testers are
continually concerned about introducing bias into a test.
D. THE FINAL TEST REPORT
Operational test reports have to be considered by program
offices early in the acquisition cycle. This is due to many
program offices being dumbfounded over how long it takes for
a final test report to be produced. As more and more
requirements are proposed, then more trials will have to be
conducted, more data gathered, and more data reduction and
analysis will have to be accomplished. It is not uncommon for
a final test report to be published up to six months after a
major test.
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One of the major contributors to data reduction time is
the increased use of video to gather data. Video is typically
used to monitor crew operations and workload. The advantages
of using video include being able to monitor what is actually
taking place. The disadvantage of using video is that
reducing the video data into measurable parameters is very
time consuming.
Other data parameters are sent to the main processing
computer where initial data reduction is performed. The
initial analysis determines whether the completed trail was
valid (no bias introduced into the test or no major equipment
outages) . Once this initial analysis is conducted and the
trial is deemed valid, then the test data is stored in the
main database for further reduction at the conclusion of the
test. The TEC is currently in the process of upgrading its
computer network and should be able to process data at a much
greater capacity.
Interim reports have typically been issued to interested
agencies in the past. The purpose was to provide some type of
early analysis to the interested agencies. However, these
interim reports had to be viewed with extreme caution.
Program offices need to be aware of the data reduction
requirements and be ready to augment analysis agencies such as
AMSAA (Army Material Systems Analysis Agency) if necessary to
expedite a test report. Program offices also need to be aware
of tools such as Model-Test-Model that has the potential of
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keeping trials and players at a minimum to answer the
operational issues of a particular system. This would greatly




Military organizations have been the source of much of the
development of modern, sophisticated modeling technique.
World War II can be taken as an arbitrary historical starting
point and perhaps specifically the early British "operational
research" on problems such as the operational use of radar and
the design of aircraft search patterns for submarines in the
North Atlantic. But the concept of models and modeling is
neither new nor specific to military applications.
The concept of a model is very broad and general, but
always subject to constraints. A model is potentially useful
to analysts and decision-makers because it represents the real
world but does not replicate it. Replicating the complex real
world would neither be feasible nor desirable. One could
spend eternity in futile attempts to take account of all the
possible variations that the complex world makes possible, in
nonsolutions or even in intelligent but unacceptably slow
experience gathering and untested learning. Rather, it is
better to simplify particular aspects of the real world to
help in solving particular problems. One doesn't want to try
to represent everything in an all-purpose model that tells
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everybody everything, solves nothing, and takes forever doing
so.
1. PURPOSES OF MODELING
Models cannot always solve problems. Many problems
cannot be solved, particularly in the military field in which
answers can only be determined in war. But when models cannot
provide solutions they should always at least "shed light."
They may do this in several ways:
The process of constructing and using a model should
increase the understanding by both the analyst and his client
of the process or problem being studied. It can be heuristic,
helping the analyst to find ways to point to a solution. But
the purpose is not just to educate the modeler. The learning
must be transferred to the user. Communication and
interaction between modeler and user must be continuous and
open.
Models can aid in making choices even in situations of
high uncertainty. Doing nothing is choosing one alternative.
Models can assist in comparing alternative weapon systems,
tactics, environments, routings, and training methods.
Relative numbers are what count in selecting among alternative
means.
Models may sometimes give answers in the sense that
the absolute numbers are taken as valid. A limited logistics
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model may be able to give estimates of absolute quantities of
fuel consumed, or vehicles required in given circumstances.
However, caution must be used when dealing with absolute
numbers as the following passage illustrates.
A bomber penetration model may give 70 percent bomber
survival, or 70 percent of targets hit. We cannot know
that 70 percent would be the real number if there were a
war, even though we may have high confidence that the
particular laydown that gave this figure will do better in
a real war than an alternate laydown that gave 50 percent
vice the above 70 percent when used in the same model [Ref
ll:p. 7].
The purpose of a model should always be subsidiary to
the purpose of the modeler or of the decision-maker he serves.
Models do not analyze anything. Analysts analyze, and models
can assist them in their task. Models should always come
after the definition of the problem. Modeling is only one aid
to the analysis. It is never clear that a numerical,
mathematical or computer model should be used, or that a
particular type of model should be used.
2. TYPES OF MODELS
There are a myriad of different types of models.
These models can be categorized in many ways. For purposes of
illustration, four taxonomies are considered:
• Application.






a . Applica tion
Application in this thesis is limited to military
applications with an emphasis on Army concerns (which,
however, interface in important ways with Air Force and Navy
forces and operations) . Models may find uses in virtually
every Army activity, at every level. An example of the
breadth of applications is given by the following partial
listing:







Strategic and Tactical Combat Operations.
Support.
Testing and Evaluation.
Though applicable, models may not be equally useful
in all of the above categories. A given model may also
involve more than one of the above applications.
Jb. Objective Function
The object (characteristic to be analyzed) may be





These categories may be broken down in various ways.
Effectiveness is a term most often used with weapon
systems; it may also apply to support systems and to various
operations. Its meaning varies with the level of operations,
or the scope of the model, and with the Figure (s) Of Merit
(FOM) chosen for its measurement. Ideally, a single FOM would
be the optimal situation-targets destroyed by a missile,
aircraft kills in air-to-air combat, or aircraft kills by air
defense. However, generally no single FOM is adequate. One
has to take into account collateral damage, damage expectancy,
and non-target destruction. Kills in situations such as air
combat cannot ignore losses. But relative attrition rates may
not tell us whether the kills were sufficient to meet the real
objective: preventing the enemy from carrying out the missions
of his aircraft other than interdiction or close air support
[Ref 7:p. 8]
.
Trying to establish a single figure of merit is not
the only difficulty in measuring effectiveness. For example,
if we are dealing with weapons systems then we may have to
consider whether we can find rational ways to compare three
different categories of weapons:
• Existing weapons.
• New weapons with greater capability than existing weapons.
• New weapon concepts that do things that can't be done now.
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Such dissimilar weapons are not easy to compare
with each other. The problem is further exacerbated by the
great difference in the time at which different systems may
become available. This often means tradeoffs between better
performance late and possible military risks earlier.
One must also ask whether a qualitative improvement
really increases effectiveness or is simply "gold-plating".
As in the case of models to which too much may be added simply
because "we can do it, and someone might use it," in weapon
systems some added features may even lessen effectiveness.
This may happen, if, for example, the added features make an
operation more difficult or maintenance more frequent.
Effectiveness is also intimately tied to cost and trade-offs
have to be made when dealing with budgets.
Cost can generally be estimated with less
uncertainty than effectiveness, and costing is at least
conceptually simpler than effectiveness analysis. This is not
to say that cost estimation is not a highly complex problem in
itself. The difficult problem in costing is the handling of
time. This factor is implicit in the basic classification of
the costs of military systems into Research &
Development (R&D) , Investment (Procurement), and Operating
costs.
R&D is the first cost incurred for a weapon system.
It may start several years before the Investment phase,
although it also generally overlaps the latter, as testing
70
plus R&D on improvements and modifications continue. R&D is
conceptually a one-time investment cost.
Investment covers the procurement of the system
itself, including initial spares. It includes items with a
long life, measured in years. Investment costs may also
continue after full deployment is reached, as modifications of
components are retrofitted to the original equipment.
Operating costs, maintenance, training, personnel
costs, fuel, etc, are incurred during the operation of the
system. Where there are many units of a system, operating
costs start when the first unit is deployed and build up until
the earliest units start phasing out. Therefore, operating
costs overlap investment and sometimes R&D costs.
These three cost elements are frequently referred
to as Life-Cycle Costs (LCC) . This is to emphasize the
importance for both analytical and planning purposes of
estimating the operating costs over the lifetime of the
system, especially when considering possible parametric
variations in levels of procurement, rate of build-up, etc.
LCC should also include estimates of salvage value.
The term cost-effectiveness was first used in post-
WW II military operations research. This was in recognition
of the fact that military effectiveness cannot be measured in
dollars. So, it is necessary to measure the effectiveness
that can be achieved for a given cost.
71
It is not possible conceptually, mathematically or
practically to simultaneously maximize one variable,
effectiveness, and minimize another, cost [Ref. 7:p. 18]. It
is always necessary to fix one and vary the other.
c. Level
The scope of a model may be expressed as the level
of optimization attempted. In most cases this is dictated by
the responsibility of the analyst, his superior, or the unit
to which he is attached. Air combat models offer us a useful
"model" of a way to categorize models in ascending order of
complexity and of potential learning about the processes
involved [Ref. 7:p. 22].
One-on-one encounters are the heart of the air
combat problem. Their outcomes depend on such probabilities
as acquisition and maneuver into favorable position - adding
up to the probability of kill by one or the other aircraft and
reflecting both chance and what is known of the
characteristics of the pilot, the aircraft, and the air-to-air
missiles involved on both sides. One-on-one models may pit
similar aircraft against each other, or one side may have a
superior system. However, one-on-one may not be realistic in
an engagement scenario.
Few-on-one may have an aircraft in combat with one
or more added enemy aircraft. What are his chances of escape
or of achieving one or more kills? Are there real world
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limits on how long a pilot would actually fight? His superior
characteristics might make excessive kills an artifact of the
model, without the introduction of a realistic engagement time
constraint.
Few-on-few may increase the realism. Now that we
may be concerned with target assignment on each side, how do
the subsumed one-on-one and few-on-one engagements add up?
How do the two groups break off? Few-on-few may also involve
interactions of dissimilar systems.
Many-on-many reflects a further step in realism
which must include all of the above, with rules for combining
these individual and group engagements. Many-on-many is also
qualitatively different in < that command decision must be
modeled. A difficulty in the many-on-many is that sometimes
the command decision model is inherent in the mathematics used
and may be unrecognized by the analyst.
At the Theater level, we may not be satisfied in
modeling who wins each engagement. We need to know how
outcomes affect the theater war. Outcomes that need attention
are areas such as interaction with the ground forces, movement
of the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area), and other measures
of progress toward victory or defeat. Theater models are the
most challenging of all, and no fully satisfactory theater
model has yet been constructed [Ref. 7:p. 24].
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d. Technique
The techniques of modeling are numerous and are
constantly growing in numbers and sophistication. A useful




• Analytic games - Consists of problem solving type games.
• Computer games - Consists of arcade-type games.
• Interactive computer games - Lets the players provide
input into the game.
• Computer-assisted war games - Consists of Corps Post
Exercises (CPX) and Field Training Exercises (FTX) where
a computer acts as the umpire to determine the outcomes of
various battle scenarios.
• Manual war games - Sand models, maps, and mock-ups are
used with individuals acting as the umpires to determine
the outcomes of battle scenarios.
• Military exercises - Actual troop exercises are conducted.
This classification by technique can be crossed with the
earlier classifications in a multi-dimensional taxonomy of
models. Not all intersections, or cells, would be of equal
interest. For instance, one would not use base force planning
on low-level (e.g., one-on-one) analytical models.
Conversely, a theater or global model is unlikely to solve a
problem of personnel training or fuel consumption.
e. Conclusion
These several ways of classifying models have been
offered as an introductory framework into the use of models in
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general. The rest of the chapter is devoted to the Model-
Test-Model concept.
B. MODEL-TEST-MODEL
The Model-Test-Model (M-T-M) concept is designed to
capitalize on both combat simulation modeling and field
testing capabilities of U.S. Army analysis agencies. The M-T-
M concept is one method that the Army can use in determining
how to modernize in this era of diminishing resources. The M-
T-M concept consists of five phases: 1) long-term planning
phase; 2) pretest modeling phase; 3) field test phase; 4) post-
test modeling and calibration phase and 5) accreditation
phase. A general overview of each of the phases will be
given.
1. Phase 1: Long-Term Planning Phase
The long-term planning phase begins by establishing
agreements between the organizations conducting the M-T-M.
The agreement is usually formalized in a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) . The MOA assigns responsibilities of the
organizations involved, their working relationships and
resourcing commitments, the terms under which resources will
be provided and obligated, and the products expected to be
delivered by each agency [Ref. l:p. 22]. This allows for the
selection of specific tests for conducting M-T-M. Because
each test on which M-T-M could be conducted will vary in terms
of responsibilities and resource commitments, each M-T-M
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project should be initiated and governed by a separate Project
Coordination Sheet by the participating elements of the
respective organizations.
2. Phase II: Pretest Modeling
This phase uses high-resolution combat simulation
models to help plan field tests. There are two types of
pretest modeling. The first is pretest modeling in support of
Force Development Test & Evaluation (FDTE) . The second is
pretest modeling in support of operational testing. In the
pretest modeling phase, it is important to use an interactive
combat simulation model because the personnel involved in
developing scenarios are not usually experienced in using
simulation models and interactive simulations are more "user
friendly" than non-interactive models. This greatly lessens
the amount of time spent on teaching personnel how to use the
model. Additionally, minimal programming support is needed in
interactive models when changes need to be made (scenario
changes, etc)
.
a. Pretest FDTE Modeling
There are two distinct advantages of using M-T-M
prior to the FDTE. First, the maneuver unit leaders are able
to use an interactive simulation model to develop scenarios
they can use during the field test. The leaders try and
determine optimum tactics for given scenarios. The scenarios
developed should resemble the restrictions developed by the
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testing personnel. Second, results from the scenario
development by the leaders can be given to the proponent of
the weapon system (such as the Program Management Office) to
improve their tactics prior to the test. This provides a
doctrinal review of the scenarios by the proponent subject
matter experts.
The primary objective of pretest FDTE modeling is
to refine test design with the goal of saving time and test
resources [Ref. 8:p. 277], In doing so, it also provides
training for the maneuver unit leaders and can decrease the
learning curve effects during the field test. Past field
tests have shown that units typically need a couple of trials
for the player units to get organized.
Jb. Pretest Operational Modeling
As with the FDTE, an interactive model is used
prior to the actual operational test. Proponent scenario and
subject matter experts are consulted to develop scenarios to
be used during the operational force-on-force field test. The
scenarios developed should resemble the restrictions developed
by the test design team. The objective prior to the
operational test is to examine whether the test objectives can
be met within the parameters established by the test design.
For example, does the terrain where the operational test is to
be conducted allow engagements by the weapon systems
throughout the required ranges? The goal is to provide
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information to improve test design (such as whether to focus
the test in MOPP (Mission Operational Protective Posture) 0/4,
defense/offense, or night/day)
.
3. Phase III: Field Test Phase
Once the early FDTE test have been conducted, then the
system is evaluated more realistically via field testing
(operational testing) . These tests are conducted to assess
how the system characteristics perform in various situations.
Field testing is performed by military personnel in a series
of trials conducted to replicate realistic employment of the
system to determine lethality, fightability, survivability,
and suitability.
When the field tests are being performed, some of the
trials should be devoted to replicate some of the successful
tactics developed by the maneuver unit leaders during the
pretest modeling. This allows the maneuver units to test some
of the tactics that were successful in the combat model
simulations. It also enables the maneuver units to see if the
pretest model tactics hold up under field conditions.
During operational testing, tactics must be unscripted
(leave as much randomness in the test as possible), but must
remain within the limits established by the test design (i.e.,
terrain boundaries, force size, etc) . Past efforts in M-T-M
resulted in the modeler expressing a desire to script the
operational trials in order to better establish a basis for
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model validation [Ref. 8:p. 278]. However, this philosophy
defeats a primary tenet of operational testing that test
players need to be free to use tactics that they would
realistically employ on the battlefield. This provides more
credible use of the system being tested.
Other than scripting the test, it is essential that
the modeler be involved in the field test to better understand
the test conduct and data. He/she should be present at the
test site observing trials and also coordinating with the data
reduction group to better understand the format of the test
data. Once the field tests are culminated, the data is then
passed on to the modeler to
(
begin post-test modeling.
4. Phase IV: Post-Test Modeling and Calibration Phase
During post-test modeling, the objective is to refine
or calibrate the simulation/model in preparation for
validation. This phase begins with the evaluator selecting
the trials to be used for post-test modeling. The objective
is to have the selected trials replicate the field test as
close as possible for validation purposes. This requires that
model input parameters be determined and updated if the same
model is used from the pretest modeling phase. The same
procedure must be used for the field test constraints that are
input into the model
.
The next step involves determining what measures of
performance to use for comparing the field test data to the
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model output data. The comparison can be accomplished using
the Micro/Macro approach. The micro approach of the
model/test comparison is the primary approach recommended
[Ref. 8:p. 279], If this method is used the model must also
replicate actual player states (i.e., routes, orientations of
weapon systems, etc) . The micro comparison analysis is
conducted at the individual events level (i.e., detections,
engagements, and player movement rates) . Parametric and
nonparametric goodness-of-f it tests on distributions can be
used to make the final comparison.
The alternative macro approach for model/test
comparison is least preferred. The reason is that the macro
measures could be the same for the model and field test data,
but much could be happening in the model that completely
differs from individual events. For a particular trial, input
the number and type of players from the test into the model
and run iterations. Compare the model output to the field
test using macro measures.
There will never be an exact match between the model
and the field test. Closer agreements can be obtained through
calibration of the model to the test. The following areas
need to be rechecked for causes of model-test differences:
data from the field test, model input parameters, and
algorithms in the model and test. Changes can then be made to
modify a test version of the model to replicate the field test
within tolerances. Any major changes to the model need to be
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provided to the organization that holds configuration control
for proposed changes to the reference version of the model.
5. Phase V: Model Validation
Model validation will continue to be a key area in M-
T-M. Before a combat simulation model can be used to extend
the M-T-M test results, it must be validated or at least
accredited. This is the most difficult task for the modeler.
The modeler must prove the credibility of a simulation model
to the user. "To say the simulation model results are
credible implies evidence that the correspondence between the
real world and the simulation is reasonably satisfactory for
the intended use" [Ref. 12:p. 13] (i.e., the model is
validated for testing and evaluation purposes) .
In accomplishing the final phase, the M-T-M team puts
together an accreditation package that consists of the results
of the model/test comparison analysis conducted during post-
test modeling. The package serves as the credibility
documents for the user. The package is reviewed by the end
user of M-T-M (such as OPTEC) . OPTEC (Operational Test and
Evaluation Command) makes an accreditation decision on the
model for testing and evaluation purposes. Once the model is
accredited, then the model can be used at OPTEC s discretion
to extend test results beyond the test environment.
The test constraints that were input into the model
during the pretest and post-test phases can now be removed.
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The doctrine or system being tested can now be carefully
evaluated in a different environment. Different types of
terrain, weather, and force size can be used in the model to
see how the doctrine or system performs. A weapon system may
appear to meet performance standards in Fort Hunter Liggett' s
terrain with a limited size force, but not perform to
standards in the Middle East with a larger size force. The
goals for post-test modeling are to improve the model,
validate the model, and use it for cautious interpolation and
extrapolation.
C. Model-Test-Model Using Janus
This section deals with the actual use of the M-T-M
concept (post-test phase) using Janus to simulate events that
occurred during a field test conducted by TEXCOM
Experimentation Center (TEC) at Fort Hunter Liggett,
California. The results of the field test were entered into
the Janus model and the results were documented in a research
paper by TRAC-Monterey. The research paper is entitled
"Comparison Of MIA1/M1A2 Battle Results Between Janus (A) and
an Operational Field Test" [Ref. 16:p. 1].
1 . Janus Overview
Janus is an interactive, stochastic, two-sided, force-
on-force, high-resolution combat model used extensively
throughout the Army. The original version of Janus was
developed at the Conflict Simulation Center at Lawrence
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Livermore Laboratory. It was later improved (Janus (A) ) by
the Janus Working Group at TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC)
,
White Sands Missile Range.
Janus (A) models individual level systems, such as
tanks, helicopters and soldiers, the battlefield environment,
and each system's interaction with other systems and their
environments. The characteristics of these combat systems
include descriptions of the weapons carried, weapon
capabilities, etc. In addition to modeling individual
systems, Janus (A) is also capable of modeling aggregate
forces.
2. Comparison of M1A1/M1A2 Battle Results Between
Janus (A) and an Operational Field Test
a. Introduction
The purpose of this modeling effort was to report
the post-test modeling results from the comparison of field
test data from the M1A2 Early User Test and Experimentation
(EUTE) with data generated from modeling of those field trials
in Janus (A) . The modeling effort had two primary goals. The
first goal was to attempt to accredit Janus (A) for use with M-
T-M, specifically in its representation of the M1A2 tank. The
second goal was to identify or verify Janus (A) modeling
shortcomings and recommend improvements.
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Jb. M1A2 EUTE Background
In December 1991, TEC conducted ten force-on-force
battles at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. The purpose of
the battles (trials) was to operationally test the new M1A2
main battle tank and compare it to the current M1A1 main
battle tank in different combat scenarios using actual
soldiers. To accomplish this effort four scenario types were
chosen: 1) Movement to Contact, 2) Deliberate Defense, 3)
Hasty Defense, and 4) Hasty Attack. One trial of each
scenario was conducted except for the Movement to Contact
scenario, which had two iterations in different areas of the
maneuver area. To ensure that results could be directly
compared, each M1A2 trial had a corresponding M1A1 trial.
Table I displays the scenarios and the number of combat
systems on each side during the field battle [Ref . 16:p. 2]
.
Table I M1A1/M1A2 EUTE SCENARIOS AND FORCE SIZES
Scenario #Blue Tanks #Red Tanks #Red I
Deliberate Defense 4 4 7
Hasty Defense 4 4 7
Hasty Attack 4 1 1
Movement to Contact I 4 2 3
Movement to Contact II 4 2 3
* Infantry Fighting Vehicle
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c. Preparation of the Janus (A) Trials
In trying to replicate the parameters of the actual
field test, TRAC-Monterey personally observed two of the test
trials. By doing so, they felt confident that they had
accurately portrayed the scenarios. In portraying the trails,
several manual conversion steps were used, as well as
automated conversion procedures.
(1) Conversion of Position Location Data
TEC provided Position Location (PL) files for
every second of the respective vehicle's location during the
battle. TRAC-Monterey converted the PL files to Janus (A)
operational files, which included weapon systems for each side
and their routes, by means of two Fortran programs.
(2) Vehicle Movement
The vehicle movements when simulated in
Janus (A) did not generally match vehicle movement in the field
trials. Specifically, while the automated conversion code
traced the exact routes followed by specific vehicle, the
synchronization of the timing of those vehicle over those
routes in Janus (A) was often not similar to that of the actual
field test timing. This occurrence is due to Janus (A) using
an algorithm that relates individual vehicle speed to the
maximum capability of the vehicle for the terrain features,
specifically slope and vegetation, that the vehicle is
traversing. Movement in Janus (A) is unable to consider the
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input of the actual driver of the vehicles in the field test.
Also, terrain resolution in Janus (A) may not allow for fine
enough replication of the actual terrain variability.
However, research currently being carried out at TRAC-
Monterey, in conjunction with the Naval Postgraduate School,
is intended to correct this deficiency.
There is an additional consideration for
movement. In a field test, once a tank is killed its movement
is terminated (an audio and visual cue is given to the tank
crew notifying them that they are killed and they stop) . The
automated version of field movement to Janus (A) movement stops
at that termination point. In a Janus (A) battle, that tank
may not be killed at the same time and place as in the field
trial. Vehicles that had terminated movement routes from the
field trial had their routes extended in Janus (A) based on
METT-T (Mission Enemy Task Terrain-Time) factors. The tank
that was killed in the "open" in the field trial may be moved
to a sheltered position by Janus (A) when the model is run.
Therefore, the location of the tank in the field trial, when
killed, may not correspond to its position in the model.
(3) Field of View
The fields of view of individual vehicles in
stationary positions must be input to accurately reflect the
battle. Janus (A) uses as a view the last direction the
vehicle travelled. TRAC-Monterey used a combination of their
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familiarity with the test conditions and METT-T factors to
ensure that stationary vehicles had realistic views.
Janus (A) uses 50 meter cells (low resolution
terrain data base) necessitating adjustments to vehicle
emplacement and movement. This means that for every 50 square
meters on the ground, Janus (A) considers the four corner
points for elevation. This causes Janus (A) to be unable to
capture the small undulations in the earth that can cover and
conceal relatively large vehicles. The end result is that
some vehicles that may be hidden from enemy view in the field
test may be visible in the Janus (A) model. This problem was
corrected by slightly moving some vehicles to take advantage
of the vegetation in Janus (A)
.
d. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Selection
TRAOMonterey considered detection ranges,
engagement ranges, and system survivability as possible
measures of performance. These measures were derived from the
Critical Operational Issues and Concerns of the EUTE (Early
User Test and Evaluation)
.
(1) Detection Range
Detection range was considered because of one
of the M1A2 ' s most significant fightability modifications, the
Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) . The CITV
enables the tank commander and gunner to look independently at
the battlefield and search for targets. However, TRAC-
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Monterey chose not to use detection range as the measure of
performance because field test detections and Janus (A)
detections do not apparently represent the same phenomenon.
Detection ranges were recorded in the test by
means of a reconstruction of the gunner/commander
communication. The time, target location, and tank location
were all reconstructed from tapes of the actual test. The
detection was credited only when a verbal or visual cue was
given by the gunner/commander.
Janus (A) detections differ in that there is no
crew involvement in the detection process: a detection is
recorded when the weapon system's sensor detects and fully
identifies the target. Therefore, TRAC expected that Janus (A)
detection ranges would be generally longer than the field test
detections.
(2) System Survivability
System survivability records the number of
friendly survivors in each battle. TRAC did not choose system
survivability because of the limited force size.
(3) First Engagement Range
First engagement range was considered because
it has the potential to demonstrate the significance of the
CITV to the M1A2. TRAC thought that using engagement range as
an MOE would capture the effect of the independent views.
TRAC also thought that they could capture the detection range
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along with the views, but without the problems inherent in
comparing Janus (A) and field test detections.
TRAC further limited their MOE to first
engagement range. Theoretically, a trial with four blue tanks
versus four red tanks could have a maximum of sixteen blue
first-round engagements. TRAC imposed this limit to their MOE
because subsequent engagements at the same target may depend
on the first engagement. A basic assumption of each of the
data analysis methods is that the data are independent.
e. EUTE Data Considerations
TEC's Range Measurement System (RMS), while
gathering timely and thorough field test data, is not a
perfect system. The PL data, while giving eight-digit PL to
within 10 meters, has some inherent error. A realistic
estimate is that actual vehicle positions are within a 30-
meter radius of the PL data point.
Another possible source of error was due to TEC's
engagement files not being complete because some engagements
were not fully captured. An example is that some files report
no target identification or range, but identify the firer.
TRAC believes this may have occurred due to improper
boresighting of the laser, RMS equipment malfunctions, or a
missed shot. Approximately 21% of engagements were lost in
this manner.
89
TRAC's concern was that the lost data may bias the
results. If, for instance, the probability of an incomplete
engagement was greater for engagements at greater range, the
resulting data would indicate shorter mean engagement ranges
than actually transpired. TRAC's belief in this regard was
that lost engagements do not indicate bias, and were generally
attributed to one tank during the battle that apparently did
not correctly boresight its laser and could not record
engagements at all ranges.
f . Experimental Design
TRAC's experimental design was intended to compare
mean first engagement ranges of the field test and Janus (A)
within each particular scenario and to determine if there were
any statistically significant differences. TRAC could then
"pool" their data, by scenario type, light conditions, and a
cumulative Janus (A) versus cumulative field test. Each
scenario was run three times.
The type of two-sample test that TRAC could do
depended on the assumptions they could reasonably make. TRAC
decided to first check the normality of the samples by using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Goodness of Fit test with a
significance level of 0.05. This test indicated that only two
samples, of the sixteen samples of Janus (A) and field trials,
rejected the null hypothesis that the sample followed an
approximately normal distribution. None of the four pooled
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samples rejected the null hypothesis. However, due to the
small sample sizes, TRAC did not have high confidence in the
K-S test results.
TRAC decided to use the t test as one of their
tests on the difference in the sample means because the
majority of their data appeared to follow an approximately
normal distribution. The t test relies on the underlying
assumptions that the two sample populations are normal and
that the two population variances are equal. However,
comparison of sample variances showed significant differences
in many cases. Despite TRAC's doubts in the validity of the
assumptions of normality and equal variance, they decided to
use the t test in their analysis and attempted to substantiate
the results using non-parametric methods.
The non-parametric method chosen was the Mann-
Whitney test. This method relies on the assumptions that both
samples are random samples from their respective populations,
and that in addition to independence within each sample, there
is mutual independence between the two samples. For this
experiment all of the assumptions were met. The Mann-Whitney
test essentially combines the two samples being compared and
ranks the values ordinally. The test statistic is then
calculated using the assigned ranks, rather than the actual
data values. This process effectively eliminates the effects





Table II displays a comparison between the eight
field trials and the sample of Janus (A) executions [Ref. 16:p.
7] . In all but two trials, the differences in the means of
the first round engagements are not statistically significant.
Table II COMPARISON OF JANUS/EUTE TRIALS


































































b. Analysis of Deliberate Defense Differences
The trials whose mean first engagement ranges were
Figure 1 M1A2 Deliberate Defense Bar Chart
statistically significantly different between Janus (A) and the
field test were the deliberate defense scenarios for both M1A2
and M1A1 . TRAC surmised that there are three common factors
leading to the differences in both trials. They are the
terrain data base, line of sight from different defensive
positions, and tactics.
In the M1A2 deliberate defense trial, the
difference may be explained by an anomaly in the Janus terrain
data base. TRAC analysis of the resulting data (Figure 1)
shows that the blue forces in the Janus (A) engaged at a much
greater range than they did in the field test [Ref . 16:p. 8]
.
The figure also shows that there were no field engagements
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from 1500 meters to 2100 meters, while Janus (A) recorded many
first engagements in this range band.
TRAC personally observed this trial at Fort Hunter
Liggett and therefore had first-hand knowledge of the events.
Soon after the battle began, the blue forces had line-of-sight
to the red force attackers and fired several shots. Yet, the
blue forces lost line-of-sight for a 600 meter period due to
terrain masking, as the red force tactically used cover and
concealment to close unobserved on the objective. This
terrain masking occurred despite the blue forces having ample
time to select the best defensive positions available in that
area.
The abrupt changes in the terrain elevations that
caused this occurrence are not captured in the 50-meter
terrain data base by Janus (A) . The blue forces in the
Janus (A) M1A2 deliberate defense scenario had longer line-of-
sight, particularly two blue tanks which took the vast
majority of the longer shots. This occurred despite placing
the tanks in the same grid location as they were in the field
test.
The other trial in which a statistically
significant difference occurs is in the M1A1 deliberate
defense scenario. In this trial, the blue forces engaged
targets at longer ranges in the field than in Janus (A)
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Figure 2 Ml Al Deliberate Defence Bar Chart
(Figure 2) [Ref. 16:p. 9]. The blue forces in the Janus (A)
version of the M1A1 trial had minimal line-of-sight . Though
TRAC-Monterey did not personally observe this trial, they were
confident that in the field test, the blue forces chose
defensive positions that allowed for optimal line-of-sight.
The defensive positions in the Janus (A) M1A1 deliberate
defense trial could not be improved with any minor
repositioning. TRAC believes that the low resolution terrain
currently employed in Janus (A) does not portray berms or sharp
folds in the ground that would make good defensive positions.
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c. Pooled Data Analysis
TRAC pooled certain scenarios that had an important
common condition. TRAC pooled all movement to contact trials,
all day trials, and all Janus (A) versus all field trials.
There were no significant statistical differences in any of
these comparisons. Table III summarizes the pooled movement













Al MTC TRIALS Janus 32 1.48 .087 .502 .515
Field 15 1.61 1.1
A2 MTC TRIALS Janus 26 .93 .436 .328 .485
Field 9 1.21 .741
POOLED MTC
TRIALS
Janus 58 1.23 .312 .191 .709
Field 24 1.46 .973
to contact trials, while Figure 3 graphically displays the
similarity of pooled Janus (A) first engagements versus pooled
field test first engagements [Ref . 16:p. 10]
.
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Figure 3 Box Plots of Cumulative Janus vs Cumulative Field Test
d. Conclusions
The majority of caparisons between Janus (A) and the
field test trials is favorable. This indicates that Janus (A)
may acceptably portray the M1A2 and M1A1 tanks. TRAC
cautiously recommended that Janus (A) be accredited for Model-
Test-Model for M1A2 and M1A1 first engagements. TRAC's
reservations remain due to the terrain database limitations of
Janus (A) and the small sample size of the field test data.
TRAC believes that there are solutions to both the
Janus (A) terrain database limitations and the small sample
size. The integration of a one-meter terrain database,
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currently available for Fort Hunter Liggett, into Janus (A)
should make more accurate line-of-sight calculations, and
subsequently more realistic engagements. This is a research
project directed by TRAC-Monterey in Fiscal Year (FY) 93.
Additionally, future field tests will benefit from pre-test
modeling, which will optimize the test design. Pre-test
modeling can focus the test trials in certain scenario types
or conditions that will more readily show differences between
the new and old weapon system and will provide a larger sample
size.
D. SUMMARY
Model-Test-Model is a concept to assist the operations
research analyst and modeler in verifying and validating
computerized combat simulation models. It also provides data
to the operational tester that is accurate enough to be
incorporated in the testing process. The successful
application of a M-T-M to testing produces two desirable
products: first, a comprehensive evaluation of a system with
credible data, and second, a reasonably well-calibrated model
of a system that can be used for extrapolations and "what if"
investigations. The overall goal of M-T-M is to save the Army
time and money by using a validated/accredited model to
provide operational test data. This operational data is used
in conjunction with field test data to provide a better
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assessment of the test and to make more accurate decisions
earlier on in the acquisition process.
The pretest phase of M-T-M will benefit the tester by
providing insight on test design. The proponent agency may
also profit by analyzing pretest results and modifying tactics
if necessary. The post-test phase of M-T-M allows the modeler
to benefit from the accreditation process and the evaluator is
able to then use the accredited model to extend test results.
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V. THE FUTURE OF TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E)
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter looks at the future of operational testing as
we approach the 21st century. This chapter also provides an
analysis of the changes that will need to be made in the T&E
community as a result of a new defense environment. Finally,
some recommendations are made of how the testing community
should react to these changes. But before these issues are
analyzed, further background into why the changes are being
brought about is necessary.
B. CHANGES IN THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT
A lesson learned from Desert Storm is that our prior focus
on strategic nuclear forces and conflicts in central Europe
did not adequately prepare us for likely future regional
conflicts. In these future conflicts we will be facing state-
of-the-art equipment from many nations-including our own. It
was clear that we will need the capability for locating and
destroying mobile targets (e.g., SCUD missile launchers), for
all-weather precision-guided weapons, and for real-time
intelligence data available on front line ships, planes and
tanks [Ref . 6:p. 10] . The information technology explosion of
the end of the 20th century will spread rapidly throughout all
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nations of the world over the next few decades, providing even
small, Third-World forces with incredibly sophisticated,
destructive capabilities.
Historically, The United States has counted upon
"technological superiority" to achieve military leadership.
The future challenge for the nation will be to maintain
technological superiority in its deployed forces. This must
be accomplished while surviving on a much smaller defense
weapons budget.
Maintaining technological superiority with a smaller
budget presents a very difficult challenge. If we look back
for the past 45 years, we see that, from generation to
generation of weapon systems, costs have been rising to match
the increasing weapons performance [Ref . 6:p. 10] . In the
future we are going to be demanding increasing performance,
but at a far lower price. In addition, we will be buying
fewer weapons, driving up per-unit production costs. In order
to realize technological superiority in our deployed forces,
advanced technology must move rapidly through the acquisition
process. However, our past performance in weapons acquisition
shows that a system takes, on average, over 16 years to field.
This situation is inconsistent with the rapid development of
new technologies.
Weapons costs and time trends are further exacerbated by
mounting problems in the U.S. defense industrial base. The
most visible sign is the hundreds of thousands of people being
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laid off in the defense industry. Rather than some rational
down-sizing and restructuring strategy for achieving future
efficiency and effectiveness in the industrial base with the
smaller budget, firms and unions have been lobbying their
congressional representatives for more "pork and
protectionism." Congress has responded by adding billions of
dollars for procurements of old weapon systems—many of which
were not even requested by DOD. The approach seems to be an
attempt to maintain an increasingly inefficient and
ineffective industrial base. This will drive weapons costs
still higher and will stretch out programs still further. A
change is needed!
Dr. Gansler (former deputy assistant secretary of defense
and the senior vice president of the Analytic Sciences
Corporation) suggests that there are four areas that represent
the largest potential for realizing far greater national
security with far fewer dollars. He warns that all four areas
are "countercultural" and therefore will be extremely
difficult to implement and will require strong, sustained
leadership. Specifically, these four new directions call for
the:
• Dramatic restructuring of the weapons requirements
process.
• Similar dramatic restructuring of the defense DT&E arena.
• Total restructuring of the defense industrial base.
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• Dramatically streamlined, and yet upgraded, government and
industry acquisition corps.
A brief discussion will be made of each of these areas. Then
their impact on the T&E community will be analyzed.
1 . Weapons Requirements Process
Of primary importance is the military requirements
process. This is what drives the acquisition process.
However, weapons requirements have been historically driven by
a desire to design the highest-performing weapons systems in
the world. Later would come the thought process of how to
build these weapons and, if possible, how to slightly reduce
the cost of very expensive weapons. If we contrast this
military requirements process with the commercial world, we
find that many new, high technology systems are also striving
for state-of-the-art performance. However, the commercial
world also has a firm requirement for low production and
support costs. This is the difference that the defense world
must remove. In the future, the DOD requirements process must
be driven by the simultaneous need to improve performance and
lower production and support costs. To achieve lower costs in
our weapons means that we must frequently look to
nontraditional approaches. The traditional approach to
weapons acquisition, i.e., writing a requirement for a new
weapon and beginning the development of a full, new system, is
more likely to be replaced with the far less costly approach
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of upgrading existing platforms and weapons with more advanced
information technology.
2. Major Changes in the Research and Development (R&D)
Process
Changing/improving the requirements process
necessitates changes in the R&D process. More focus will be
on the upgrading of existing weapons and platforms with
improved information technology subsystems. There will also
be other major changes in the RDT&E (Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation) process.
The primary change will be increased allocation of the
limited defense resources to the "front end" of the
acquisition process. Since production of current weapons is
so expensive, the choice for the future appears to be to
invest in R&D. This will allow the nation to keep its
technological edge. Then a decision will have to be made to
place a few of these R&D systems into production, but only
when they represent a quantum leap forward in operational
military effectiveness. We can expect to see far more use of
weapon and subsystem prototypes in the future—with the
explicit expectation that many of these will not go into full
development and production. Rather, instead of prototypes
being used solely for technical feasibility demonstrations,
they will also be used for demonstrating af fordability. This
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results in a very different definition of "prototypes" than
has been used in the past.
3. Combined Industrial Base
In the area of defense industrial base, Dr. Gansler
fully expects the nation will no longer be able to afford, nor
desire to have, a unique defense industry. Rather, he expects
to see a largely integrated civil/military industrial base.
Dr. Gansler writes that three recent shifts in technology have
brought about this possibility: 1) many commercial parts and
technologies now exceed military requirements and have higher
performance and far lower costs than their military
counterparts; 2) modern "flexible" manufacturing technology
allows for different military and commercial products to be
built on the same line, as long as the production processes
are similar; and 3) critical defense technologies are
increasingly overlapping with technologies that are essential
for future commercial competitiveness. Thus, Dr. Gansler
envisions that future products will be designed to meet dual-
use requirements and will be designed to be built in dual-use
factories, using largely commercial parts, materials, and
software. This will require dramatic changes in such areas as
cost accounting and auditing, military specifications and
standards, and procurement practices. Such changes are
necessary for the DOD to achieve the efficiencies and state-
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of-the-art technologies needed for an affordable, yet
effective, military.
Dr. Gansler's views are consistent with those stated
in a January 1992 DOD Briefing by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense. The meeting was attended by the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His
views are also consistent with those espoused by Former Under
Secretary of Defense Don Yockey in his May 1992 memorandum on
Defense Acquisition. His memorandum was distributed DOD-wide
to include the secretaries of the military departments and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. Professional Acquisition Corps
The defense world will have to move toward streamlined
organizations and more highly trained and skilled personnel.
These skilled people must be able to have management decisions
delegated to them and can be empowered to take on the added
responsibility associated with that decision-making. This
means that, on both the government and industry sides, the key
people in the acquisition community of the 21st century are
going to have to be highly experienced and educated. There
will be far fewer of these key people. Yet, they will be
given the tools (such as advanced computing, communications,
and display capability) that will allow them to do their work
far more efficiently and effectively.
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The Army has made great strides in this area by
forming the Army acquisition Corps. The acquisition corps
will consist of dedicated, professional acquisition personnel.
These personnel will serve throughout their careers in the
acquisition community. They will also receive intensive
acquisition education and training. This sharply contrasts
with the old method of putting nondedicated people in Program
Management positions and letting them "sink or swim". This
method historically led to weapon system programs being behind
schedule and over budget. The acquisition corps is an attempt
to mitigate this problem.
C. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF CHANGES TO T&E
How will the changes in the defense environment affect
T&E? One of the most dramatic impacts comes from lessons
learned in the commercial world as a result of increasing
international competition. Japanese firms have shown that the
most efficient and effective method of developing and
deploying the most advanced products is to use a "continuous
product and process improvement" approach. This means that
you don't plan on putting every new technology into the system
right from the start. Instead, as each technology is proven,
you continuously modify the products, and you, simultaneously,
continuously improve the design, production, and support
processes to improve the reliability and lower the costs of
the product. For the defense community, this changes the
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whole acquisition cycle concept. For the T&E world, it causes
a dramatic change in outlook. It actually returns T&E to its
original function of being a part of a continuous development
process, rather than an "independent auditor" of the
development process. The T&E focus must be on evaluation
(versus "testing to see if it is acceptable") since the T&E
community must always be looking for ways to improve
performance at lower costs. It becomes important to have
failures in the test process. This is the only way the
testing community can learn, and continue to improve. The
goal is to test systems beyond their limits, in order to see
what can be done to make them even better in the next round.
As with the other RDT&E changes, the new emphasis on
prototypes that are being evaluated for the combination of
technical feasibility, af fordability, and operational utility,
places a far greater burden on the testing community. To
reduce cost systems, the testing community must assess which
performance parameters are the cost drivers, which are
essential to significantly enhance operational utility, and
which are just nice to have. In essence, the testing
community becomes an essential element in the af fordability
trade-offs between cost drivers and performance drivers. The
testing community must also judge whether or not the prototype
results are "scalable" to the operational production versions
of the system, and to the likely operational scale threats
that may be encountered. Finally, the T&E community will be
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tasked to help make the most critical decision in terms of the
new acquisition cycle. The decision is to determine whether
or not these prototypes, if developed and produced, would
represent a substantial improvement in military force
effectiveness.
In the past, the most critical decision for the testing
community did not occur until after the weapon system had gone
through full-scale development and was essentially ready for
production. This new, earlier decision will be a more
difficult one. However, part of the rationale for these new
prototype developments is to maintain a core engineering and
manufacturing defense industrial base for next-generation
weapon systems. If the T&E community decides that a
particular prototype does not represent a substantial
improvement, the requirement will be sent back to the R&D
community for another cycle. The R&D community will then use
the next generation of technology which will, hopefully,
provide the needed substantial enhancements in either lower
cost or higher performance.
Three developments occur from this new weapons acquisition
concept. First, a much more rapid cycle time from the
initiation of a concept to the field deployment of a prototype
is needed to determine if a concept is worthy of subsequent
development and production. Second, the testing community
must be able to take the design from prototype to production
rapidly— if we decide to produce it. This will enable the
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nation to maintain technological superiority of fielded
systems. Third/ the testing community will most likely have
a much more highly integrated development test and operational
test program on these prototypes since there will be
simultaneous testing for technical feasibility and operational
utility.
Along with the new acquisition process placing a greater
burden upon the testing community, so will the new industrial
base strategy. The use of far more commercial parts,
subsystems, and software means that more testing of these
elements will be required to ensure that they meet the
military's need. They will now have been designed and built
to commercial specifications and standards, not traditional
military specifications and standards.
1. Information Technology
The impact of supercomputing, advanced displays, and
next-generation communication technology will be seen first in
the weapon systems and the command, control, communications,
and intelligence arenas. This will have the effect of
dramatically changing not only weapon systems themselves, but
even how warfare will be fought in the 21st century [Ref . 6:p.
13] . For the testing community, this will cause a significant
shift from the current focus on weapons testing to a far
greater emphasis on "operations testing". Operations testing
will tightly link the command, control, communications, and
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intelligence arena into the weapons operations themselves. It
will also cause a significant shift from traditional hardware
testing to software testing (a much more difficult task)
.
2 . Simulation
The impact of the information technology, coupled with
a shrinking budget, is the move toward more reliance on
simulation and modeling (Chapter III gives a detailed account
of the Model-Test-Model concept which will be an integral
part of the modeling effort for T&E) . One can envision the
shift in the T&E regime to that of live testing a system only
to validate the models. While there will be heavy reliance
upon simulation and modeling, it is clear that it will be
absolutely essential, in all cases, to run a limited number of
tests to achieve total confidence in the validity of the
models. It will be essential for the simulations and models
themselves to be "validated" and written to be reusable and
transportable. They will be used throughout the weapon
system's life cycle. They will be used for establishing the
requirements, then in the preliminary design phase,
subsequently, as the system evolves, and eventually as it is
upgraded. Throughout this process, as tests are run the
models will become more valid. They will rely on
complementary weapons systems, rather than on the system under
development for this further validation. We can see that
modeling and simulation are not alternatives to weapons and
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subsystem testing, but rather necessary complements, which
will improve the effectiveness and efficiency associated with
testing.
Simulation and modeling will also be used to improve
the T&E process. Through the use of CIM (the Corporate
Information Management system that is being developed to
improve data processing within the government), CALS (the
Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistic System that will
directly couple the government and industry information
systems), and EIP (the Enterprise Integration Program that
will link together the information systems within firms and
between firms in the industrial structure) , it should be
possible to dramatically reduce the time and level of manpower
associated with the overall T&E process [Ref. 6:p. 14]. As
numerous recent studies have demonstrated, T&E is a (if not
the) major cause of the excessively long acquisition cycle for
weapons today [Ref. 6:p. 14]. To be fair, these studies have
also shown that the majority of the time is not taken up with
testing, but in "waiting, " preparing documentation, and other
low-value activities that can be dramatically reduced through
the application of advanced information technology. In the
future, the program office, the testing community, and the
contractors involved will all be "on the net" whenever
required and will be able to reach agreements collectively in
days instead of weeks or months (the testing community has
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made a major stride in this area with the establishment of
TECNET (Test and Evaluation Community Network) )
.
3. Future Changes Require New Tools
The testing community can look forward to assistance
in the new computer-based tools being developed. These tools
include "expert systems" to assist in evaluating test results.
These tools also include the Defense Advance Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) -sponsored "Case-Based Reasoning" models, which
will aid a program office in researching relevant historic
test programs. The developed support tools and simulations
and models will have to be as generic as possible, but their
funding will require significant process (R&D) dollars. If
the funding for these tools is not realized then the long-term
benefits that they provide will be lost.
4. Increased Diversity of Systems to be Tested
The testing community can expect to see a far greater
variety of systems to test. This is due to the manufacturing
industry shifting toward flexible manufacturing systems,
combined with a move toward a continuous product and process
improvement cycle. There may be only a few of each type of
system, and because of their user friendliness this will be no
significant problem for the operators or maintenance people.
However, such variety will tax the testing community.
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5. Impact on T&E Personnel
The changing defense environment and its impact on the
testing community will necessitate the need for extremely
high-quality government and industry T&E personnel. The
transformation taking place will require that the testing
community no longer focus on "go/no-go" decisions, but rather
that they apply management judgement in evaluating the systems
under test [Ref . 6:p. 14] . The concept of "technically
acceptable, low bid wins" is incompatible with "world-class"
operations, and the testing arena will be no exception.
Therefore, to be a "world-class" operation the testing
community has to recruit, train, and contract for only the
best.
D. HOW THE TEST AND EVALUATION COMMUNITY SHOULD REACT TO
CHANGES IN THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT
To handle the changes being brought about in the defense
environment, the T&E community must understand its function.
The T&E function is to provide information on which decision-
makers can rely with full confidence in making acquisition
decisions [Ref. 15:p. 13]. To do this, the testing community
must conduct sound tests, evaluate the results carefully and
provide reports that are clearly written and free from bias.
Organizational structures must not be allowed to coerce
inadequate testing or biased reporting; but at the same time,
the testing community cannot so distance itself from the
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developmental process that they do not understand the system
under development. Additionally, the testing community must
be able to competently evaluate the utility for T&E purposes
of data that is generated during the development process. All
of this must remain true after the testing community
accommodates the changed environment in which T&E must take
place.
The testing community must respond to its changing
environment in two ways [Ref 15:p. 13]. The first entails
doing the routine T&E functions efficiently and effectively.
The second involves finding new and better ways of operating.
These two methods are discussed in further detail.
1 . Routine Functions
Among the functions to be done more effectively, the
testing community must:
a. Make sure that lovered budgets do not mean
Inadequate T&E.
The testing community needs to be very careful not
to allow its standards to be compromised. Program managers,
and possible even decision-makers, will want to have
effectiveness issues resolved with lower testing. The testing
community must resist the pressure to eliminate testing that
it believes to be important. If not supported in these
matters, the testing community must be forthright in
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establishing a written record that makes clear who made what
decision.
Jb. Integrate Life-Cycle Management.
In the past when program executive officers and
program managers got less funding than they knew they needed,
the elements of the program that were "axed" first tended to
be training, documentation, and logistic support. Until
reinstitution of life-cycle management or "cradle-to-grave"
program oversight by the same organization, this situation
will continue. This is because the "buyer" knows he/she will
not be accountable later for in-service support measures.
c. Be vatchful of the user's interests in
coordinating on Test and Evaluation Master Plans
(TEMPs) .
With lessened participation by the user in the
acquisition process, the testing community must ensure that an
adequate TEMP is produced. It must ensure that the TEMP and
derivative test plans cannot lead to satisfactory evaluations
for systems that do not meet the needs of the soldiers. When
staffs of senior officials "lean" on the testing community to
do something that is believed to be incorrect, ensure that it
is made a matter of record so that there is an audit trail.
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d. In Development, Test and Evaluation (DT&E) be
cognizant of the technological and engineering
capability of manufacturing to produce the system.
This is so that the testing community is not caught
unaware of the decision to begin production. The testing
community has been not been vigilant in this area in the past.
The possibility of short-fused orders to begin production
means more and better scrutiny in the future.
e. Get involved in every project as early as
possible.
The earlier the testing community is involved, the
better for the whole program. This has the effect of being
able to alert the program manager of potential T&E problems
early in the program. It also allows the testing community to
gather more data on the system in order to have a better and
shorter T&E period.
2 . New Functions
To survive in the new defense environment, the testing
community needs to conduct T&E competently. The testing
community also needs to show the acquisition officials that it
(testing community) is ready and able to do so in ways that
serve the officials' needs in the new defense environment.
The new environment demands that the testing community be able
to respond to an opportunity to conduct an operational
assessment, DT&E, or, if the system is sufficiently mature,
117
OT&E (Operational Test and Evaluation) , in field
circumstances, on short notice. The Secretary of Defense must
be confident that the testing community can respond promptly
and effectively so he will want to do the T&E that should be
conducted before making the decision to produce a design
prototyped earlier. This can be achieved by a change in the
T&E cultural mindset. Specifically, the testing community
must not be thought of as the final exam at the end of the
process, but as an integral part of the process from the very
beginning. To accomplish this, the testing community must:
a. Enable the test project officer to be able to
respond immediately to an opportunity to test.
This can be done only by developing new internal
procedures to facilitate such a response. The testing
community has the talented people to do this if those people
are empowered to do so. This includes supporting them with
authority, resources, and test formulation software that could
reduce the necessary lead time to 24 hours or less.
Jb. Form pre-designated deployable T&E teams.
The deployable teams would be organized and
equipped to respond within a few hours to an opportunity to
test. They should be provided with the ability to establish
voice communications with the test project officer.
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c. Preplan the movement of test teams and equipment.
This would involve looking at testing on a global
scale. The testing community must be cognizant of
opportunities to test anywhere a system may be deployed.
d. Establish and sign Memoranda of Agreement (MCA)
with commanders of theaters vhere testing may
occur.
The MOAs should define the responsibilities of the
person (s) designated by the theater commander to conduct the
tests. The responsibilities of the T&E teams must be provided
by the T&E organizations. The MOAs must also establish the
authority of the T&E teams to operate independently of
coercive influences. It must define measures to protect the
security of the test data and the procedures to be followed in
emergencies.
e. Establish field data protocol.
Means of data reduction and analysis between the
field teams and the test facility must be established. This
would enable data analysis to begin as soon as testing begins.
Procedures need to be enacted to provide for the completion of
evaluation, drafting the report, and review by the test team
before the report is released, regardless of the location of
the test team.
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f. Demonstrate the T&E changes to the acquisition
officials.
Acquisition decision-makers must be made aware of
the commitment of the testing community to be an efficient and
competent part of the acquisition cycle. Action must also be
taken to update applicable DOD and service directives to
reflect the testing community's new capabilities.
E. SUMMARY
The operative word in the defense community is change.
The Department of Defense can no longer afford to do "business
as usual" and expect to survive. In response to decreased
personnel and budgets, defense organizations will either adapt
and change or die. This is particularly true of the T&E
community. The acquisition process must change and is
changing to meet the realities of today and tomorrow. The T&E
community cannot afford to take a "wait and see attitude", but
must take a proactive approach of dealing with the coming
changes. This means that instead of being the "final exam" at
the end of the acquisition cycle, the testers have to be an
early and on-going part of the process.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The underlying theme in the acquisition world is change.
This is reflected in the trends in the defense industry.
These trends include a changing threat, reduced budget,
consolidation of resources, fewer systems, etc. To quote Bob
Costello, the keynote speaker at the International Test and
Evaluation Association (ITEA) /American Defense Preparedness
Association workshop in Las Cruces in March 93, "Change or
die" [Ref. 2:p. 3]. He predicted adamantly that if an
organization isn't in Washington understanding the changes and
hurrying back home to make the necessary adjustments in his or
her organization, that organization may not be around very
long. Although some might think Costello overstated his
point, few would disagree that there is far more pressure to
change.
This statement is the cornerstone for the need for change
in Test and Evaluation (T&E) . There is a strong need for more
T&E on the front end of acquisition. The focus of T&E must
shift from one of testing to see if the system is acceptable
to one of evaluation. This is necessary to ensure that a
system, if developed and produced, will provide a substantial
increase in military force effectiveness. The Defense
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Department has shown an interest in early assessments and the
desire to start planning for the evaluation as early as
possible. This is the change the testing community must plan
for—the necessary and critical emphasis on evaluation. No
one is suggesting that the T&E community give up testing, but
everyone involved in testing needs to advocate that a much
better job be done of evaluation.
A number of things are happening that necessitate this
reemphasis on evaluation. With the reduced budget, the
testers will have to demonstrate, before funds are committed,
that a new system can make a contribution. This is the reason
for the interest in "distributed interactive simulations"
where new concepts can be evaluated long before metal is bent.
We will also have less funding for new test capabilities while
at the same time we are faced with more complex technologies
to test. All this requires more up-front thinking and
planning.
The testing community needs to get serious about
minimizing duplication between development and operational
testing, using modeling and simulation, and taking advantage
of other areas where we can reduce testing cost and increase
evaluation efficiency. The testers need to define an
evaluation framework early in a program— i.e., take a
systems's approach to T&E (Dr. Deming's approach to quality).
The testing community has long recognized that such a
framework is needed, and has discussed its importance in
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forums such as the combined ITEA and Military Operations
Research Society workshop on "Emphasizing the *E K in T&E.
However, there are few examples of an integrated,
comprehensive evaluation framework using a combination of
contractor, development, and operational testing to optimize
a T&E program from a total system's perspective. The testing
community has talked about this for a long time. The T&E
community must be proactive in changing the defense
environment and in implementing the changes it knows it must
make.
B. RECOMMENDED AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
Areas recommended for future research include the
possibility of consolidating some T&E activities in order to
reduce operating costs. Another area for future research
would entail developing a database that could be used to
provide a detailed list of the resources available throughout
the T&E community.
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ARMVAL Direct Fire Simulator
Advanced Development Weapons Fire Simulator
Air Force Base
Army Helicopter Improvement Program
Amplitude Modulation
Army Materiel Command
Army Material systems Analysis Activity
Advanced Anti-Armor Validation
American Standard Code for Information
Interchange
Built-in-Test
Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistics
System
Computer-Aided-Test
Combat Developments Experimentation Command
Computer Data Link
Corporate Information Management
Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer
Corps Post Exercise



































Development Test and Evaluation
Extended A-Station to Micro-B
Extended Micro-B to A-Station





Early User Test and Evaluation
Federal Aviation Agency
Force Development Test and Evaluation







































Integrated Information Control Center
Instrumentation Computer Network
Infantry Direct Fire Simulator System










K-Band TRADOC Obscuration Pairing System
Life-Cycle Cost
Laser Spotting Information System
Linear Triaxial Accelerometer
Mobile Army Field Instrumentation System
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Mobile Multi-Purpose Control Station
Memorandum of Agreement
Measure of Effectiveness










Operational Test and Evaluation Command
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Operational Test
Operational Test and Evaluation








































Schwartz Electro-Optical Large Gun Laser
Schwartz Electro-Optical Small Gun Laser
Serial Programmable Instrumentation Pallet
System
Serial Programmable Logic Box






Test and Evaluation Community Network
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
Test and Experimentation Command





Video Data Reduction/Debriefing Center
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VGVA Variable Gain Voice Amplification
VHF Very High Frequency
VIDS Visual Information Display system
VIMS Video Instrumentation Mobile System
VTR Video Tape Recorder
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